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1. SCOPE 
The core of the project is the development and application of a method to consider human and 
organization factors to be integrated with the assessment methods proposed by technical 
standards applied for evaluation of safety critical equipment and procedures of industrial 
machine. 
The first target of the analysis was to test the applicability of most recent generation standards 
that are not yet fully acquired by different industries and to verify their effectiveness in safety 
assessment. 
Based on the results achieved by the first phase of work, the second objective consisted of 
devising a method to account qualitatively and quantitatively for the human factor in the 
current applied standards (e.g. Failure mode and Effect analysis (FMEA), standard HazOp 
analysis and in Integrity Level of Safety system (SIL) analysis), verifying how a proper account 
of the impact of Human and Organizational Factors (H&OF) in the operational phase may 
provide a sensitive change in the results of the assessments. 
This approach aimed at optimizing risk assessment methodologies, data and information, in 
order to achieve quantifiable results in the industrial domain: maximum availability, minimum 
unscheduled shutdowns of production, economic maintenance, minimum incident and accident, 
but keeping into account all relevant parameters, overlooked until now. 
Our efforts are aimed at defining an improved methodological framework encompassing the 
integration of H&OF into safety analysis by means of quantitative risk assessment schemes. 
In the integrated logical-probabilistic model will be innovative in that: 
-it will be explicitly centered on the effects of abnormal and normal condition arising from 
human interactions with the machines and their protection systems; 
- it will include a critical incorporation of all useful elements of latest advances in Human 
Reliability Analysis methods and an explicit focus on the capability to lead in the direction of a 
design improvement solution and the prioritization of interventions; 
- it will include a realistic assessment of the maintenance procedures and policies adopted in 
the commercial companies. 
Other authors [17] have proposed a model to take into account human factors in safety-critical 
systems considering the HF as a barrier function in the system. In these studies the operator is 
modeled as a safety function, i.e., sensors, logic solvers and actuator thus accordingly to the 
one components of a Safety Integrity Function (SIF). 
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Our efforts instead are aimed at defining an improved methodological framework 
encompassing the integration of H&OF into safety analysis by means of quantitative risk 
assessment schemes. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
The project started from a case study on a press where an accident occurred. 
Through an appropriate risk analysis and reliability data a priority of interventions has been 
defined to reduce risks in the specific machinery under investigation. The main target of the 
analysis was to test the applicability of most recent generation standards, that are not yet fully 
acquired by different industries, and to verify their effectiveness. 
Several research projects and programs on system safety engineering and quantitative risk 
analysis in the last 40 years offered very strong evidence of the crucial role that Human and 
Organizational Factors (HOFs) play in major accidents. Nevertheless, many of the models and 
application described in scientific literature demonstrate very limited impact on the technical 
standards applied for evaluation of safety critical equipment and procedures. 
The standards descending from IEC 61508, developed for process plant and machinery contain 
requirements and recommendations for drafting, integrating and validating safety-related 
electrical, electronic and programmable control systems (SRECS) for systems in relation to the 
significant hazards they are expected to be exposed to. The reference parameter to be assessed 
is the Safety Integrity Level (SIL), that is a threshold availability. 
SIL is closely related to reliability concept, index of intrinsic functionality of the system. 
The reliability mathematically predicts the behavior of the system in foreseeable operating 
conditions. More clearly it expresses numerically the probability of correct operation of an 
apparatus during a certain period of time under certain environmental conditions, for which it 
was designed. 
However  this standards present some limitations and the analysis resulting in a SIL tends to 
overlook the following: 
• the possible sources of missing intervention of the protection systems stemming from the 
interactions with the operators, during normal or abnormal conditions; 
• the effect of maintenance policy and planning methodologies, e.g. through the concepts of 
system health management, diagnostic and prognostic and/or their integration with HOF 
analysis. 
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2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY RELATED TO INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY 
Compliance with these standard provides one means of conformity with the specified essential 
requirements  given in Annex I of the EC Directive 2006/42/EC, but not only. 
Other benefits followed such as: 
• less redundancy and more adequate and accurate choice in system architecture and 
consequent cost reduction; 
• reduction of risks and consequent injuries; 
• enhancement motivation of your staff; 
• provide leverage for competitive advantage: maximum availability, minimum unscheduled 
shutdowns of production, economic maintenance, minimum incident and accident. 
2.2 MACHINERY DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES 
Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC is a set of rules defined by European Community addressed 
to manufacturers but not only. The principles of the Directive must be known also by the user 
for a simple reason, the end users of the machine should be actively involved throughout the 
whole risk assessment process and should play a crucial role in ensuring an evaluation of the 
conditions leading to a safe operations of the equipment. The connection between Directive 
2006/42/EC and IEC regulation is linked to essential requirement given in Annex I of the 
Directive. 
Machinery means an assembly, fitted with or intended to be fitted with a drive system other 
than directly applied human or animal effort, consisting of linked parts or components, at least 
one of which moves, and which are joined together for a specific application. 
The safety component is an element used to fulfill a safety function; the failure or malfunction 
of this component endangers the safety of persons.  
To ensure a certain safety integrity level to safety component is therefore a indispensable 
requirement to comply with the regulation. 
2.3 DEFINITION OF THE GOALS 
The main target of the study was to test the applicability of most recent generation standards, 
that are not yet fully acquired by different industries, and to verify their effectiveness. 
The study was focused on a hydraulic press where an accident occurred. 
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The fortuitous fall of the template centering tool into the mold induced the worker to bring his 
hands into an exposed position to fix it. Suddenly and without command activation  the descent 
of the punch occurred, causing serious injury to the worker. The accident was the consequence 
of a  failure in the left  button of the two-hand control safety, that caused an improper  contact 
between the conductors of the control circuit (It was as if the operator had pressed the two 
buttons on the two-hand control safety). A risk analysis was performed. 
Based on the results achieved by the first phase of work, the second objective consists of 
devising a method to account qualitatively and quantitatively for the human factor in verify the 
Integrity Level of Safety system (SIL) called “operational SIL” which may differ from the 
design SIL, due to the impact of human and organizational factors (H&OF) in the operational 
phase. The design of automatic systems and the control of the interaction with operators have 
become much more complex. In particular, the consequences of an erroneous human action or 
of a “misunderstanding” between human beings and technologies, can have unrecoverable and 
dangerous consequences. Once SIL assigned to Safety-Related Electrical Control System 
(SRECS) for a good quality assessment to identify the possible causes and the possible 
consequences of the unforeseen actions identified to consider human error, was essential. 
2.3.1 Why the safety standard EN IEC 61062? 
The loss of the safety features of the electrical command and control systems of the machinery 
caused by the age of the device, lack of maintenance or improper repairs/modifications have a 
strong impact on possible causes of an accident. The objective of designer and end users has to 
be to avoid these accidents. 
The choice of this standard derived from IEC 61508 that originally developed for process 
plants, machineries and vehicles and that contains requirements and recommendations for 
validating safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable control systems.  In effect the 
EN IEC 62061 represents a sector-specific standard under IEC 61508.  
The IEC 62061 describes the implementation of safety-related electrical control systems on 
machinery and examines the overall lifecycle from the concept phase through to 
decommissioning related to safety requirements. Quantitative and qualitative examinations of 
reliability of the safety functions form the basis. 
It is intended to facilitate the specification of the performance of safety-related electrical 
control systems in relation to the significant hazards (see 3.8 of ISO 12100-1 [6]) of machines. 
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There are many situations on machines where SRECS are employed as part of safety measures 
that have been provided to achieve risk reduction. A typical case is the use of an interlocking 
guard that, when it is opened to allow access to the danger zone, signals the electrical control 
system to stop hazardous machine operation. Also in automation, the electrical control system 
that is used to achieve correct operation of the machine process often contributes to safety by 
mitigating risks associated with hazards arising directly from control system failures. This 
standard gives a methodology and requirements to: 
- assign the required safety integrity level for each safety-related control function to be 
implemented by SRECS; 
- enable the design of the SRECS appropriate to the assigned safety-related control function(s); 
- integrate safety-related subsystems designed in accordance with ISO 13849 [13]; 
- validate the SRECS. 
This standard is intended to be used within the framework of systematic risk reduction 
described in ISO 12100-1 [16] and in conjunction with risk assessment according to the 
principles described in ISO 14121 [8]. A suggested methodology for Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL) assignment is given in informative Annex A. 
Measures are given to co-ordinate the performance of the SRECS with the intended risk 
reduction taking into account the probabilities and consequences of random or systematic faults 
within the electrical control system. 
The EN  IEC 62061 has been listed as a harmonised standard in the Official Journal of the EU 
since 31.12.2005 but it was not perfectly acquired by the stakeholders and this has been an 
additional source of interest. 
3. THE RELIABILITY CONCEPT IN THE SAFETY STANDARD EN IEC 
62061 
The reliability is the probability of proper operation of a system  for a specific period of time 
under certain conditions. The Safety Integrity Level, main concept of the technical standard, 
involves this concept and it is an indispensable requirement related to industrial machinery. 
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3.1 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN THE ANALYSIS 
As mentioned above this technical regulation describes the implementation of Safety-Related 
Electrical Control Systems (SRECS) on machinery and examines the overall lifecycle from the 
concept phase through to decommissioning from the point of view of reliability of the system. 
For a correct application of the standard the risk must be estimated and the SIL defined for each 
hazard on which the risk has to be reduced through control measures. 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety 
device or to specify a target level of risk reduction. In simple terms, SIL is a measurement of 
performance and reliability required for a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). 
The SRECS achieves the defined SIL on the basis of architectural constraints which permit to 
ensure a Probability of a Dangerous Failure (PDF) not too high. 
In fact the probability of a dangerous failure of each Safety-Related Control Function (SRCF) 
shall be equal to or less than the failure threshold value defined in the specification of the safety 
requirements. 
SIL PFH 
3 ≥ 10-9 to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
Table 1: Intervals of the average probability of a dangerous failure per hour (PFH) corresponding to the safety 
integrity levels (IEC 62061:2005). 
The safety standard IEC 62061 shows a simplified approach to the estimation of probability of 
dangerous random hardware failures for a number of basic subsystem architectures and gives 
formulae that can be used for subsystems assembled from either low complexity subsystem 
elements or complex subsystem. 
The formulae are a simplification of reliability analysis theory and are intended to provide 
estimates that are biased towards the safe direction. The precondition for the validity for all 
formulae given in this sub-clause is that 1 >> λ x T1, where λ is failure rate (1/h) and  T1 is the 
smaller of the proof test interval or the lifetime, and the subsystem is operating in the “high 
demand or continuous mode”. Therefore, the following basic equations can be used: λ = 
1/MTTF where MTTF means Mean Time To Failure. 
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3.1.1 Architecture of safety related control function 
The probability of dangerous failure of each subsystem due to random hardware failures to 
perform the allocated function blocks shall be estimated taking into account: 
a) the architecture of the subsystem as it relates to the allocated function blocks under 
consideration; 
b) the rate of failure of each subsystem element in any modes which would cause a dangerous 
failure of the subsystem but which are detected by diagnostic tests; 
c) the rate of failure of each subsystem element in any modes which would cause a dangerous 
failure of the subsystem which are undetected by the diagnostic tests; 
d) the susceptibility of the subsystem to common cause failures which would cause a 
dangerous failure of the subsystem; 
Note 1: Where comparison of redundant components is used for fault detection, failure of the 
fault detection means can occur when the redundant components fail at the same time in the 
same mode. This can occur due to a common cause referred to as a common cause failure 
(CCF) that is expressed as a beta (ß) factor. A simplified approach to estimate the 
susceptibility to common cause failures is given by Annex D of the standard. 
e) the diagnostic coverage of the diagnostic tests and the associated diagnostic test interval; 
f) the intervals at which proof tests are undertaken to reveal dangerous faults which are 
undetected by diagnostic tests and/or the mission time of the subsystem element(s) which 
should not be exceeded in order to maintain the validity of the information given in items b) 
and c); 
g) the repair times for detected faults where the subsystem is designed for online repair. 
The standard provides four different type of architectures: 
1. Basic subsystem architecture A: zero fault tolerance without a diagnostic function. 
In this architecture, any dangerous failure of a subsystem element causes a failure of the 
SRCF. For architecture A, the probability of dangerous failure of the subsystem is the sum 
of the probabilities of dangerous failure of all subsystems elements (Figure 1): 
λ DssA = λ De1 + ....+ λ Den              
PFHDssA = λ DssA x 1h 
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Figure 1: Subsystem A logical representation 
2. Basic subsystem architecture B: single fault tolerance without a diagnostic function.  
This architecture is such that a single failure of any subsystem element does not cause a loss 
of the SRCF. Thus, there would have to be a dangerous failure in more than one element 
before failure of the SRCF can occur. For architecture B, the probability of dangerous 
failure of the subsystem is (Figure 2).  
λ DssB =(1 – β)2 x λ De1 x λ De2 x T1 + β x (λ De1 + λ De2 )/2      
PFHDssB = λ DssB x 1h 
where 
T1 is the proof test interval or lifetime whichever is the smaller. 
β is the susceptibility to common cause failures. 
 
Figure 2: Subsystem B logical representation 
3. Basic subsystem architecture C: zero fault tolerance with a diagnostic function. 
Any undetected dangerous fault of the subsystem element leads to a dangerous failure of the 
SRCF. Where a fault of a subsystem element is detected, the diagnostic function(s) initiates 
a fault reaction function. For architecture C, the probability of dangerous failure of the 
subsystem is (Figure 3): 
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λDssC = λDe1 (1 – DC1) + ....+ λDen(1 – DCn)  
PFHDssC = λDssC x 1h 
 
                         
Figure 3: Subsystem C logical representation 
4. Basic subsystem architecture D: single fault tolerance with a diagnostic function(s). 
This architecture is such that a single failure of any subsystem element does not cause a loss 
of the SRCF (Figure 4Figure 4, where 
T2 is the diagnostic test interval; 
T1 is the proof test interval or lifetime whichever is the smaller. 
β is the susceptibility to common cause failures; λD = λDD + λDU; where λDD is the 
rate of detectable dangerous failures and λDU is the rate of undetectable 
dangerous failure. 
λDD = λD x DC 
λDU = λD x (1 – DC) 
For subsystem elements of different design: 
λDe1 is the dangerous failure rate of subsystem element 1; 
DC1 is the diagnostic coverage of subsystem element 1; 
λDe2 is the dangerous failure rate of subsystem element 2; 
DC2 is the diagnostic coverage of subsystem element 2. 
λDssD = (1 – β)2 {[ λDe1 x λDe2 x (DC1 + DC2)] x T2/2 + [λDe1 x λDe2 x (2 – DC1 – DC2) ] x 
T1/2 } + β x (λDe1 + λDe2)/2     
PFHDssD = λDssD x 1h 
For subsystem elements of the same design: 
λDe is the dangerous failure rate of subsystem element 1 or 2; 
DC is the diagnostic coverage of subsystem element 1 or 2. 
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λDssD = (1 – β)2 {[ λDe2 x 2 x DC ] x T2/2 + [λDe2 x (1 – DC) ] x T1} + β x λDe   
PFHDssD = λDssD x 1h 
 
 
Figure 4: Subsystem D logical representation 
Two of these type of architectures were applied in this research project (chapter 4 paragraph. 
4.1.4). 
4. CASE STUDY 
The range of machines to work metal sheets is very large. Among all types of existing 
machines the study is focused on a hydraulic press where an accident occurred. 
A worker in charge of stamping and bending steel handles for pots, was injured. The fortuitous 
fall of the template centering tool into the mould induced the worker to bring his hands into an 
exposed position to fix it. Suddenly and without command activation the descent of the punch 
occurred, causing serious injury to the worker. The accident was the consequence of a failure in 
the left button of the two-hand control safety, that caused an improper contact between the 
conductors of the control circuit. 
Analysis of the electrical circuit diagram showed that this failure was enough to start a machine 
cycle: it was as if the operator had pressed the two buttons on the two-hand control safety.  
To the machine involved in the accident a risk analysis technique has been applied in order to 
identify the lacking protective means and thus priority of interventions to reduce risks.  
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4.1 RISK ANALYSIS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAFETY STANDARD 
The following diagram (Figure 5) shows the process of risk assessment step by step.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Risk assessment method 
4.1.1 HazID Analysis 
A risk assessment should include a look at each functional part in turn, making sure that every 
mode of operation and all phases of use are properly considered, including the human-machine 
interaction in relation to the identified functions or functional parts. For this reason the Hazard 
Identification approach (HazID) was chosen to investigate the criticalities of the tool 
(Lees,1996). This kind of analysis is the starting point for a detailed risk assessment. 
The approach is divided into two phases: the former developing the description of the functions 
performed by the system, the latter is oriented to analyze one by one those functions, to 
highlight possible deviations, their causes and  the consequent effect (Table 2). 
Identifying all the elementary functions and analyzing then allowed to assess the risk index for 
each of them, thereby highlighting not tolerable one.  
Main Function Elementary Function  Hazard/Deviation  of Function  Cause  Consequence  
     
Table 2: Hazard identification 
 
Limits of machine 
Hazard identification 
Risk estimation 
Risk assessment 
Risk estimation 
     END 
         Safe 
machine? 
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In accordance with EN ISO 14121 [8]  the sequence of analysis was to: 
- establish the limits and the intended use of the machinery; 
- identify the hazards and any associated hazardous situation; 
- evaluate the risk and decide on the need for risk reduction. 
In a hydraulic press the process basically consists in transforming a flat metal sheet in a 
concave body by means of the coordinated action of a punch and a blank holder. 
The following life cycle phases of the machine can be identified: 
- Assembly 
- Installation 
- Starting 
- Processing cycle 
- Facility 
- Safety systems 
- Maintenance 
- Decommissioning 
- Disposal 
In each phase different hazards has been identified and the most significant are: electrical, for 
direct or indirect contact; contact with tools; gravity fall of the slide/ram; accidental start of the 
machine; increased pressure in the hydraulic circuit.  
In table of Annex  12.4 extracted from the HazId analysis template (Annex 12.1), the more 
critical events are reported. These deviations can cause different consequences and in the worst 
case: crushing, shearing or amputation of fingers. 
HazId analysis results showed that the more hazardous area in hydraulic presses is the tools 
area on the front side of the machine  and preventive measures have to be taken to deal with the 
relevant hazards, as stated also by technical regulations. 
One of the most critical phases revealed by the analysis is  the use of the machine in manual 
mode cycle. 
Moving die cushions, blanking holders and work piece ejectors shall be safeguarded. 
During the verification of compliance of the press, evidence came out that the failure of the 
button was an event entirely predictable and quite common statistically. Nowadays, in 
accordance with the requirements of EN 693:2009, the control circuit of the press must be 
equipped with adequate safety protection that puts in safe the machine in case of failure. 
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If the old machine had had a two hand control devices more reliable and a safeguarding using 
an electro-sensitive protective equipment (ESPE) probably the injury would not have occurred. 
But at the time of the accident, however, these requirements were not requested by law and the 
machine was correctly designed according to the standards of that period. 
The whole risk analysis underlines that the most dangerous operation phases are “Setting 
tools”, “Starting loop for material processing” and “Feeding and loading raw materials”. 
To reduce the hazard of coming into contact with the tool the appropriate protective system is 
the addition of a safeguarding. 
The safety standard EN 693:2009 for Hydraulic presses requires that the safety functions, “two 
hand control devices” and “safeguarding”, are installed with a specific category that correspond 
to a certain level of safety integrity. 
The categories are the instruments to achieve the Safety Integrity Level (SIL); they establish 
the required behavior of Safety-Related Parts of Control System (SRP/CS) compared to its 
resistance to damage. In category 1 to improve resistance to damage is achieved primarily 
through the selection and application components. In categories 2, 3 and 4 the best performance 
for a specific safety function is achieved mainly by improving the structure of the SRP/CS. 
4.1.2 Risk assessment and SIL assignment 
Through an appropriate risk analysis and reliability data a priority of interventions has been 
defined to reduce risks in the specific machine under investigation. 
The following figure (Figure 5) shows an example of a practical way of carrying out a risk 
assessment leading to the estimation of a SIL requirement for each Safety-Related Electrical 
Control System (SRECS). This methodology should be performed for each risk that can be 
reduced by a safety-related control function and implemented by a SRECS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Workflow of SIL assignment process 
Risk estimation should be carried out for each hazard by determining risk parameters that 
should be derived from the following: 
- Severity of harm, Se 
- Probability of occurrence of that harm expressed by Class indicator (Cl) which is function 
of: 
• frequency and duration of the exposure of persons to the hazard, Fr; 
• index of probability of occurrence of a hazardous event, Pr;  
• possibilities to avoid or limit the harm, Av. 
Cl = Fr + Pr + Av 
Using the Table below (Table 3), where the severity (Se) row crosses the relevant column Class 
(Cl), the intersection point indicates whether action is required. The black area indicates the 
SIL assigned as the target for the Safety-Related Control Function (SRCF). The lighter shaded 
areas should be used as a recommendation that other measures (OM) should be used. The white 
box indicates that the danger is properly treated and therefore complies with the requirement of 
the Machinery Directive. 
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Severity 
(Se) 
Classe (Cl) 
3-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-15 
4 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3 
3  (OM) SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
2   (OM) SIL 1 SIL 2 
1    (OM) SIL 1 
Table 3: Matrix of SIL assignment 
Example: for the crushing hazard in tools’ dangerous area the following values are assigned 
(EN ISO 14121): Se= 4 irreversible consequence: death, losing an eye or arm; Fr= 5: the 
frequency of exposure is ≤ 1 h; Pr=3 and Av= 3: the operators are trained and know the 
criticality of the machine, but failure of the machine is not always predictable in time to avoid; 
then : 
Cl = Fr + Pr + Av = 5 + 3 + 3 = 11 
Using  the matrix of SIL assignment (Table 3), this would lead to a SIL 3 being assigned to the 
SRCF that is intended to mitigate against the specific hazard. 
For an up-to-date hydraulic press, often SIL is already assigned by the standard law of type C 
through  the use of categories; when SIL is not indicated it is correct then to proceed as in the 
example. 
 Moreover, not all machines have a specific technical standard: for this reason it will be useful 
to know how to apply this method. 
In the case of a hydraulic press safety standard at point 5.3.15 requires that active opto-
electronic protective devices (AOPD) must be conform to type 4  of EN 61496-1:1997 which is 
equivalent to a category 4 that corresponds to a SIL 3, as achieved through the risk analysis  of 
the example. 
SIL 3 means that the system shall be redundant and monitored (R&M), where a fault occurs in 
one channel of a two channel control system, so that the other channel remains operative. 
4.1.3 SIL verification trough Safety Standard EN IEC 61062 
One of the main purposes of functional safety analysis is the determination of required safety 
integrity level (SIL) of the safety-related functions to be realized by safety-related systems. 
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Safety integrity is a fundamental concept in IEC 62061 and it is defined as the “probability of a 
safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety function under all stated 
conditions within a specified period of time”. 
The standard defines three safety integrity levels, where SIL 3 is the highest level and SIL 1 is 
the lowest. Each level corresponds to an interval of the probability of a dangerous failure per 
hour (PFH) as shown in the Table below (Table 4). 
SIL PFH 
3 ≥ 10-9 to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
Table 4: Intervals of the average probability of a dangerous failure per hour (PFH) corresponding to the safety 
integrity levels (IEC 62061:2005). 
The safety functions identified from the risk analysis are divided into safety sub-function; these 
safety sub-functions are than assigned to actual devices, called subsystems and subsystem 
elements. 
A safety-related control system is made up of several subsystems. The safety-related 
characteristics of these subsystem are described through the following parameters: 
• SILCL: SIL claim limit, (maximum SIL that can be claimed for a SRECS subsystem in 
relation to architectural constraints and systematic safety integrity). 
• PFHD: Probability of dangerous failure per hour 
• T1: lifetime 
These subsystems may in turn be made up of various interconnected subsystem elements 
(devices) with parameters to calculate the subsystem’s corresponding PFHD value. 
Safety-related parameters for subsystem elements (devices) are: 
• λ: Failure rate; for wearing elements: described through the B10 value that is the expected 
time for 10% of the sample fails. 
• SFF: Safe failure fraction, it is the fraction of the overall failure rate of a subsystem that does 
not result in a dangerous failure. 
On electromechanical devices the failure rate is indicated by the manufacturer as a B10 value, 
based on the number of cycles. The time-based failure rate and lifetime must be determined 
through the switching frequency for the respective application. 
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Internal parameters to be established during design/construction for a subsystem including 
subsystem elements are 
• T2: Diagnostic test interval 
• β: Susceptibility to common cause failure 
• DC: Diagnostic coverage 
• PFHD: The PFHD value of the safety-related control system is calculated by adding the 
subsystems’ individual PFHD values. 
4.1.4 SIL computation for the safeguarding of Hydraulic press complies with safety standards 
Once SIL has been assigned to Safety-Related Electrical Control System (SRECS), it is 
fundamental to calculate the SIL associated to that component and to verify if it is equal to the 
previously assigned SIL. 
As mentioned above, the major danger zone on hydraulic press is the tools area and preventive 
measures shall be taken to deal with the relevant hazards. 
Mode of production, mode of cycle initiation and mode of operation are fundamental to 
understand which safeguarding methods should be adopted. 
Guard system has to reduce the risk as far as possible, considering the significant hazards and 
the mode of production. 
The selected combination of safeguarding measures shall protect all exposed persons. 
With the introduction of European standards of safety all working sides of the press must be 
carefully protected (see Table 5).  
Safety  
objective 
Safety  
measures 
Compliance with the Machinery 
Directive 
Accessibility to moving 
parts: the front 
The front of the machine is 
protected by  light barriers 
1.3.7 Risks associated with moving 
tools 
1.4 Required characteristics of guards 
and protective devices 
Table 5: Compliance with the Machinery Directive 
The light barriers are installed to protect the area from possible danger or accidental access. 
The light barrier is connected to a safety circuit that generates a safe shutdown of the beam 
through the solenoid safety. 
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The identified SRCF is: “during operation, the photocell works in guard position, thus 
interrupting the range of the photocell the press stops any movement of the machine and it is 
placed in security conditions”. 
The SRCF has been described through functional blocks. 
As seen above, the assigned SIL for this SRCF through the risk analysis  is 3 and also safety 
standard recommended category 4 corresponding to a SIL 3.  
To achieve the required SRCF the choice is needed of a Safety-Related Electrical Control 
System (SRECS) designed accordingly. 
Decomposition to a structure of functional blocks (FB) is showed below (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Functional block 
Once identified functional blocks, subsystems (SS) were chosen (Figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Subsystem composition 
In this example, the target failure value for the safety-related control function is SIL 3 this is 
equivalent to a probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFHD) in the range ≥ 10-9 to < 10-7. 
The probability of dangerous random hardware failure of the SRECS (PFHDSRECS) is the sum of 
the probabilities of dangerous failure per hour of all subsystems (PFHD1to PFHDn) involved in 
the performance of the safety-related control function: 
PFHDSRECS = PFHD1 + ...+ PFHDn 
Each subsystem has its own well-defined architecture. 
The architectures of subsystem Sensor and Logic are all based on logic 1oo2 (1 out of 2) and 
the basic architecture is of type B (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Subsystem B logical representation 
This architecture is such that a single failure of any subsystem element does not cause a loss of 
the SRCF. Thus, a dangerous failure in more than one element has to occur before the failure of 
the SRCF happens. For architecture B, the probability of dangerous failure of the subsystem is: 
λDssB = (1 – β)2 x λDe1 x λDe2 x T1 + β x (λDe1 +λDe2 )/2  
PFHDssB = λDssB x 1h 
where: 
T1 is the proof test interval or lifetime whichever is the smaller; 
β is the susceptibility to common cause failures. Where a redundant architecture is used to 
achieve the required probability of dangerous random hardware failure of a subsystem and a 
Common Cause Failure (CCF(s)) can remove the effect of that redundancy, the probability of 
dangerous random hardware failure based on the probability of occurrence of the common 
cause shall be added to the probability of dangerous random hardware failure of a subsystem 
based on the use of redundancy. 
For the Actuator an architecture of type D was provided (Figure 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Subsystem D logical representation 
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This architecture is such that a single failure of any subsystem element does not cause a loss of 
the SRCF, where 
T2 is the diagnostic test interval; 
T1 is the proof test interval or lifetime whichever is the smaller; 
β is the susceptibility to common cause failures; 
λD = λDD + λDU; where λDD is the rate of detectable dangerous failures and λDU is the rate of 
undetectable dangerous failure. 
λDe1 is the dangerous failure rate of SS element 1; 
DC1 is the diagnostic coverage of SS element 1; 
λDe2 is the dangerous failure rate of subsystem element 2; 
DC2 is the diagnostic coverage of SS element 2. 
For architecture D, the probability of dangerous failure of the subsystem is: 
λDssD = (1 – β)2 {[ λDe1 x λDe2 x (DC1 + DC2)] x T2/2 + [λDe1 x λDe2 x (2 – DC1 – DC2) ] x T1/2 } 
+ β x (λDe1 + λDe2)/2 
PFHDssD = λDssD x 1h 
In this case study the data have been provided directly by the manufacturer and are: 
Light barrier: PFHD = 3.79 x 10-9 
Input: PFHD = 2.90 x 10-10 
PLC: PFHD = 9.20 x 10-9 
Output: PFHD = 8.60 x 10-10 
Instead for the actuator PFHD has been calculated with formulae provided by the standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Subsystem Actuator logical representation 
For subsystem elements of the same design the formula becomes: 
λDss5 = (1 – β)2 {[ λDe2 x 2 x DC] x T2/2 + [λDe2 x (1 – DC) ] x T1} + β x λDe 
Subsystem  Actuator 
Hydraulic 
component 1 (λDe1) 
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Common cause 
failure 
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where: 
λDe= 7.64x10-7 
β = 0.10 
T2 = 0.5 
T1 = 20 years 
The results is λDss5 = 7.69 x 10-8 
Actuator: PFHD = 7.69 x 10-8 x 1h 
The total PFHD of SRECS will therefore composed as follows (Figure 12): 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Block diagram 
PFHDSRECS = 3.79x10-9 + 2.90x10-10 + 9.20x10-9+ 8.60x10-10+7.69x10-8= 9.11x10-8 →SIL 3 
The realized SRECS is suitable for SRCF (SIL3 ). 
4.1.5 Results of  the application 
This case study has shown that the performance of a safety instrumented system in the 
operational phase is influenced by many factors; not only by the system design and the related 
testing and maintenance strategies, but also by the operating conditions. 
A significant part of all industrial accidents is caused by unanticipated actions of people during 
operation and maintenance, and the organizational perspective on safety shows that these 
human errors often are caused by aspects of the organization and the working environment. 
It became clear that human and organizational factors could affect the performance of safety 
instrumented systems and may threaten the achieved SIL. For this reason the future challenge 
in this research was to take in to account the human factor in the risk assessment used as a base 
for assigning integrity levels of safety systems (SIL) to the identified security functions. 
Input 
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The approach will give a prediction of the achieved SIL during operation, called operational 
SIL (chapter 5) which may differ from the design SIL, due to the impact of human and 
organizational factors in the operational phase. 
5. LIMITS OF THE STANDARD 
The technical regulation IEC related to safety standard of machinery is not completely 
exhaustive for the aspects of detail affecting the interface human being-machine. 
Likely one of the possible causes is the fact that the concept of SIL, that derived from IEC 
61508 originally developed for process plants (actually mostly automated) has been passed on 
sectors most closely linked to human activity. 
5.1 HUMAN FACTOR FOR “SIL” CALCULATION 
The standard IEC 62061 for instance contains requirements and recommendations for drafting, 
integrating and validating Safety-Related Electrical, electronic and programmable Control 
Systems (SRECS) for machinery in relation to the significant hazards they are expected to be 
exposed to. However no indication is provided in respect to the possible sources of hazards for 
the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) to be evaluated stemming from the interactions with the 
operators, during normal or abnormal conditions. 
The effects of human error on system performance could change significantly the results of risk 
assessment. The standards doesn’t provide any clear approach to perform risk analysis taking 
into account human factors. 
5.1.1 Results from the first step of analysis and subsequent development 
Actually, many studies show that erroneous human actions are the predominant causes of 
relevant incidental events. 
The results from the first step of the analysis and other surveys as BGIA study (paragraph 
5.1.2) suggests the need of properly assessing of these risks attributable to human error and the 
need of reducing system vulnerability to human error impact. 
The core of the project is the development and application of a method to consider human and 
organization factors to be integrated with the assessment methods proposed by technical 
standards applied for evaluation of safety critical equipment and procedures. 
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5.1.2 BGIA Study 
Institutions for statutory accident insurance and prevention (Germany and Switzerland) through 
a survey on a sample of 1605 workers between the years 1996 and 2000, has investigated the 
scale of tampering with machinery safety to obtain a specific analysis of the reasons of that. 
The study was supported by the data shown below (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13: Statistics of accidents relating to use of machinery 
The investigation revealed that the reasons why the operator by-pass the safety devices are due 
to comfort, time gain, simplification of the work and achievement pressure, emphasizing once 
again how important it is to take into account certain problems (human factors) right from 
SRECS design stage. 
The study describes the way to by-pass the safety devices for each type of safe guarding: 
manipulation of electro-mechanical devices by bridging, fixed guarding tampering or 
removing, manipulation of optoelectronic protection devices by repositioning, etc. 
General findings of BGIA study show that: 
 60% of manipulations apply to machinery which was generally in compliance with generally 
in accordance with the technical requirements of the standards;  
 40% during manual setting mode and observation; 
 37% either permanent or temporary bypassed; 
 25% during safety system in override mode; 
 14% of machines covered in the study are manipulated constantly; 
 51% of all observed manipulations result in accidents; 
 34% of the companies tolerate the manipulation of the machines. 
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The last statement shows once again how some users ignore the existence of some standards 
also if the regulations were already issued.  
BGIA study was a good tool to identify improper human behaviors during the analysis. 
5.1.3 “Operational SIL” 
Human and organizational factors affect the performance of safety instrumented systems during 
operation and may threaten the achieved SIL, but this is usually not explicitly accounted for. 
Therefore, based on the results achieved by the first phase of work, the second step of the 
research consisted of developing an approach to assess the impact of human and organisational 
factors on the achieved SIL in the operational phase of safety instrumented systems 
(operational SIL). The objective consisted of devising a method to account qualitatively and 
quantitatively for the human factor in the current applied standards (e.g. Failure mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA), standard HAzOp analysis and in Integrity Level of Safety system 
(SIL) analysis), verifying how a proper account of the impact of human and organizational 
factors (H&OF) in the operational phase may provide a sensitive change in the results of the 
assessments. 
5.1.4 Integrating human factors in a safety analysis with an engineering approach 
Once modeled the logic of the system and man-machine interface we had to proceed with 
quantitative assessment of the Human Error Probability (HEP) and finally to calculate 
Probability of Dangerous Failure per Hour (PFHD) of the SRECS in order to assess the 
“operational SIL”. If it is minus or equal to SIL assigned then SRECS will be suitable for 
Safety-Related Control Function otherwise it will be necessary to carry out a failure reduction 
analysis and to repeat IROA analysis (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Flowchart Operational SIL verification 
The observations and results from the first target of the analysis led to try to define a method to 
consider human and organizational factors to be integrated with the assessment methods 
proposed by technical standards applied for evaluation of safety critical equipment and 
procedures. 
In the logical-probabilistic model the following element of innovation has been considered: 
• it was explicitly centered on the effects of abnormal and normal condition raising from human 
interactions; 
• it included a critical incorporation of all useful elements of latest advances in Human 
Reliability Analysis methods and an explicit focus on the capability to lead in the direction of a 
design improvement solution and the prioritization of interventions. 
Incorporating human factors (HFs) into safety analyses is rather difficult and complex exercise. 
For the project purpose we needed of a methodological framework which could ease the way in 
which safety analysis may account for human an organizational factors (H&OF) since the early 
stages of the analysis. 
For these reasons the Integrated Recursive Operability Analysis (IROA) was chosen as a first 
attempt to reach the second goal of the study. 
A further evidence of the importance of taking into account the integration of human factor in 
risk analysis was given by the case study carried out by me at Trinity College of Dublin where 
another approach was applied (Chapter 6 paragraph 6.4.1). In that occasion the Risk Assessment 
was performed using an ad hoc Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) template where the 
functional analysis included the human tasks as well as a technical aspects. 
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Further the risk levels associated to each possible failure mode was obtained using the risk 
matrix proposed by the Military Standard MIL-STD-882. The overall method aimed at 
providing the assessment of a Risk Level similar to the Safety Integrity Level evaluation 
required by standards descending from IEC 61508 (originally developed for process plants, 
machineries and vehicles contain requirements and recommendations for validating safety-
related electrical, electronic and programmable control systems). The results of the analysis 
proved that a proper account of the impact of human factors related issues provide a sensitive 
change in the overall risk level associated to the installation.  
5.1.5 Two possible approach for the new methodology 
For the reasons explained above, to verify how a proper account of the impact of human and 
organizational factors in the operational phase provides a sensitive change in the result of 
reliability analysis, the first approach to take into account was IROA methodology.  
This approach is similar to that of the classic Recursive Operability Analysis, but with some 
added features that enable one to accommodate systematically H&OF into the process (Chapter 
6 paragraph 6.1). 
This first attempt to apply IROA methodology shows that this type of analysis highlights the 
position where in depth human factor analysis must be carried out. It is a qualitative approach as 
well, but more complete and systematic than the HazId methodology applied in the first phase 
of the study. 
Once the point is identified in which the human erroneous action may occur it will be necessary 
to insert the study of human factors and the assessment Human Error Probability (HEP). 
Our efforts are aimed at defining an improved methodological framework encompassing the 
integration of H&OF into safety analysis by means of quantitative risk assessment schemes. 
In order to do that the suggested tool is the Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) [40], 
[41], [42], [43]. This tool allows modeling the logic of a complex system; it provides a 
representation of all the possible alternative states into which the system could evolve, as a real 
logical and temporal sequence of events. 
IDDA integrated with Task Analysis (TA) (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.4) could allow to obtain a 
detailed quantitative analysis of human factors directly during the same risk assessment. 
Both approach will be pursued in this study.  
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6. LITERATURE SURVEY AND FIRST ATTEMPTS TO APPLY NEW 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
Following a thorough investigation in literature about methods of analysis that would allow to 
take into account the human factor in risk assessments, in this chapter some methodological 
approaches among those studied are presented and applied to the case study of press. The results 
obtained by the applications afterwards have allowed  to define the final integrated approach 
presented in chapter 7. 
6.1 IROA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Recent development of Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) approaches aimed at 
including human and organizational factors and a way to reach this purpose was the IROA 
framework. 
This methodology is similar to that of the classic Recursive Operability Analysis, but with some 
added features that enable one to accommodate systematically H&OF into the process. 
The main frame of the IROA is still made up of two blocks (Figure 15). 
According to the inhibit concept, the former block is devoted to the identification of those 
hazards that drive the system out of control, while the latter is conceived to modeling the 
effectiveness of protective systems.  
 
Figure 15: IROA framework 
31 
 
The first block, i.e., that grouping column 1–3 in Figure 15, is devoted to the identification of 
those primary events that leads the system out of control. In this part of the analysis even human 
failures are now accounted for in an integrated fashion together with technological ones. In 
particular, human interventions in this block have to be modeled as pre-initiators of events, 
meaning those acts that contribute to let the system’s components to fail or be in an undetected 
failing state. In the IROA scheme pre-initiating human failures are modeled, together with the 
technological ones, in column 2 with the aim of unveiling primary human-related root causes. 
The second block, that grouping column 4–9 in Figure 15, instead, is devised to identify and 
accommodate post-initiator human interventions, i.e., those human actions that contribute either 
to prevent the dangerous transient to further proceed to TE or to worsen it by accelerating its 
occurrence (co-causes). 
In the IROA scheme the Top Event (TE) occurs if, and only if, there is an ineffective 
intervention of protective means. This definition allows for the accounting of the dynamic 
process of recovery in which human intervention plays a key role. 
There is a real interpenetration and collaboration between technology and humans, making the 
system much safer. The failure occurs actually only when the intervention of both the automatic 
protective means (APM) and humans fail. 
In the IROA methodological frame the trade-off between an optimal human–technology system 
and a bad one is modeled by attributing the ineffective intervention of protective means to the 
following two main causes: 
• MI of protective means and 
• human failure. 
In the IROA concept, the human failure to recover has to be taken into account in two different 
cases: 
• if the alarm system fails or the operator fails to ‘‘detect’’ it or another form of indication 
(misreading, misjudging, etc.), or 
• if the plant is left without Engineered Safety Features (ESFs), due to their by-passing. 
In both cases, a missing or ineffective intervention of Erroneous Intervention of Protective 
Means (EIPM) can be considered, and if its missing or ineffective intervention occurs, it will 
bring up directly to the ineffective intervention of protective means, i.e., fail to stop the wrong 
action. 
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6.1.1 Detailed analysis applied on the case study 
For each critical event detected by HazId analysis in a specific scenario as material load or tool 
change phase, we tried to apply IROA to take into account human and organizational factors 
and the way in which workers could by-pass the safety devices to calculate “operational SIL” 
and compare it with assigned and verified SIL according to safety standard. 
In this application we have considered as before the case of hydraulic press but unlike the first 
step of the project we have considered a machinery of last generation updated with current 
developments in technology and with all required safety devices included. 
We present an extract related to crushing hazard in tools’ dangerous area during the setting tools 
phase (Figure 16). From the analysis the worst case of accident is limb amputation if the 
automatic protective means fails and if the operator fails the recovery intervention. 
The main cause of the top event seems to be the accidental starting of the machine and the 
analysis has been reflected in the construction of the logic tree presented below (Figure 17).  
Deviation Causes Consequences 
Automatic 
Protective 
Means 
(APM) 
Warnings/
Alarms 
APM and/or 
alarm 
bypass 
Erroneous or 
Ineffective recovery 
intervention 
Missing 
Interven
tion of 
EIPM 
TE 
 
Contact 
with tools 
1. Accidental 
starting of the 
machine 
Injury, 
compression, 
shearing, upper 
limb amputation 
(in some cases 
death) 
      
2. Fall under gravity 
of the beam that 
holds the punch 
3.Failure of  ending 
stroke 
1.Accident
al starting 
of the 
machine 
4. Faulty contactor 
of two-hand control 
devices, all the 
contacts remain in 
the energized 
position 
Contact with 
tools  
MI Light 
barrier 
 Light barrier 
 
 
 
Erroneus 
repositioning of light 
barrier, no 
appropriate safety 
distance 
 Limb 
amput
ation 
*A third person 
operates the 
command without 
noticing a colleague 
who has his hands 
in the machine 
Erroneus manual 
reset of the safety 
system 
Erroneous setting of 
the selector 
switches key 
operated 
Restore electricity 
supply after a break 
4. Faulty 
contactor, 
all the 
contacts 
remain in 
the 
energized 
*Short circuit due to 
improper contact 
between cables 
Contact with 
tools  
      
Improper use of 
two-hand control 
device  
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position 
5. Wrong cable 
connection 
5. Wrong 
cable 
connection 
*Wrong electric 
diagrams 
Contact with 
tools  
      
*Human error (può 
derivare dalla 
manutenzione o 
dall’installazione 
della macchina) 
2. Fall 
under 
gravity of 
the beam 
that holds 
the punch 
6. Failure of 
hydraulic system 
Contact with 
tools  
      
*Mechanical failure 
6. Failure 
hydraulic 
system 
*Failure of pressure 
relief valve 
Contact with 
tools 
      
*Failure of pressure 
exhaust valve 
*Failure of restraint 
valve 
3.Failure 
of  ending 
stroke 
*Failure to open the 
electrical contacts 
Contact with 
tools 
      
Figure 16: IROA framework for setting tool phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Fault tree from IROA framework 
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6.2 IDDA APPROACH 
IDDA is an Event Tree empowered with conditionings, both logic and probabilistic. 
This mean is a computerized version of General Logic, whereas Event Tree remains an 
important instrument within this Logic. It is a tool aimed to a correct and coherent application 
of the probability theory.  
Through this approach it is possible to model the logic of the systems; system’s representation 
is done delineating all of its possible behaviors which describes the real logic-temporal 
consequence of the events involved.  
Every alternative scenario is developed according to a logical approach Cause – Consequence, 
by means of a synthetic language, which tends to simulate the human mind. 
To apply this methodology is necessary to outline the problem through a semantic-syntactic 
translation. The instrument for this translation is a logic language that is compound of 
questions, statements and conditionings. 
The aim by Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) approach is to introduce an 
analytical methodology which, by examining the structure of the sequence of activities to be 
done while using the machine is able to identify intrinsic weakness a priory and propose 
corrective actions to make them safer and more efficient. 
This tool should provide effective description of each task performed by operator in sequence 
in the use of machine , and, above all, highlight the mechanisms which may generate possible 
operating problems and /or consequences during execution of these tasks.  
       For a good implementation of logic model a detailed knowledge of human behavior was  
necessary through once of the different human error analysis techniques.  
Starting from the analysis of a technological system through IDDA it is possible to integrate in 
the logical model a task analysis describing where and why the operator can cheat or by-pass 
the safety system.  
With this model we are expecting a higher SIL called “operational SIL” taking into account 
also human errors bringing to optimised design of the Safety-Related Electrical Control System 
(SRECS). 
6.3 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Hollnagel (1998) and Kirwan (1994) have listed different human error analysis techniques, 
including ATHEANA (A Technique for Human Error Analysis), CREAM (Cognitive 
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Reliability and Error Analysis Method), HEART (Human Error Analysis and Reduction 
Technique), HEIST (Human Error Identification in System Tools), THERP (Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction) and others. 
The goal of these techniques is to determine the reasons for human error occurrence, the factors 
that influence human performance, and how likely the errors are to occur.  
THERP uses the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Event Tree (ET) as its basic tool. In 
Figure 18 the schematic representation of the Human Reliability Event Tree is shown; the 
capital letter represents the failure while the minuscule letter represents success. 
However because THERP is a technique that offers advantages in terms of compatibility with 
the classical methods related to the reliability there is a great application of the methodology, 
both fully or as a source of data for evaluation, possibly with other formal methods, of human 
errors. We have used it for the second purpose. 
For these reasons the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction was chosen to be part of the 
new methodological approach.  
 
Figure 18: Example of HRA-ET 
The scheme below (Figure 19) resumes the dynamics of an accident caused by the human 
failures. 
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Figure 19: Accidents model 
6.4 THERP METHODOLOGY FOR HUMAN AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) is a method to predict human error 
probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be caused by 
human errors alone or in connection with equipment functioning, operational procedures and 
practices, or other system and human characteristics that influence system behavior. 
THERP requires the analyst to determine whether the error to be examined is one of omission, 
one of commission, or diagnosis and sources of operator burden include the following: 
• time constraints 
• diagnosis 
• decision making command and control  
• physiological factors 
Handbook supplies a great number of values of “nominal” probability, groups into 27 tables in 
the Chapter 20 of the manual [44] in which are contained the data derived from a series of 
information obtained experimentally and from experts elicitation. 
The adjective “nominal” is to indicate that such values don’t consider the specific situation and 
they must therefore be adapted. 
The data for human error probability (HEP) in THERP tables referred to the assumption of a 
lognormal distribution for the human error probability density function (truncated in 0 and 1).  
Each type of evaluation of human action is necessarily tied to a certain degree of uncertainty: 
the introduction of the curves of distribution stems from the need to extend the concept of  
punctual estimation of probability to human variability. 
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When the word “Uncertainty Bound” (UCB) is used, we refer it to the extension of Human 
Error Probabilities (HEPs) related to log-normal distribution (Figure 20). It considers two 
values: UCB lower and UCB upper; the square root of their division is called Error Factor (EF). 
 
Figure 20: Log-normal distribution 
For example in the estimation of HEP with this format: 0.01 (0.003 ÷ 0.03) the UCBS are 
represented by the numbers in parentheses. 
Alternatively, the uncertainty limit value are replaced by the value called Error Factor: the 
previous case should be indicate as: 0.01 (EF=3), where the EF’s value is rounded off. 
In this case the limit values can be obtained with the relations: 
UCBlower ≅ HEP/EF 
UCBupper ≅ HEP×EF 
In the tables two values are reported: the median of the distribution and error factor.  From this 
two values the mean value for the lognormal distribution is obtained to be used for assessing 
the final HEP. 
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Each mean HEP was modified by the effects of stress and experience level in case of 
emergency conditions, and in the other cases it was changed to take into account the ergonomic 
constraints (THERP table 20-16).  
6.5 TASK ANALYSIS 
Task analysis permits to describe the interaction between the operator and the technologies. 
To understand when and how the operator could commit mistakes or omitted actions it was 
necessary to implement a decomposition of operation into component tasks considering the 
phases of commissioning, normal operations and inspections-maintenance. 
The objective of the task analysis is to identify the key tasks so that it could be easier to 
identify possible wrong action that operator can commit. 
For example a task can be mis-applied, operation did not occur, or the operator does more than 
what the task requires.  
In some cases the operator could don’t perform as required because he has not enough time. 
A good task analysis permits also to avoid that operator has too many tasks, that he doesn’t 
perform two or more step at once, and so on.  
In this specific case study the task analysis was performed using an ad hoc template where the 
machine’s functional analysis included the human tasks as well as the technical aspects. 
The starting point for a task analysis is a set of clear task descriptors for all the task elements 
which are associated with particular task. Normally, these descriptions would be derived from a 
hierarchical task analysis. 
6.5.1 Which kind of task analysis? 
The purpose of Human Reliability Analysis is to estimate both the likelihood of the human 
error made in carrying out a required task (commission error) and the human error made when 
a required action it is not carried out (omission error).  
The decomposition approach was a good mean for the purpose to determine the control and 
information requirements of each step that the operator has to perform with the machinery. This 
approach was used in the case study of press because decomposition method is the main 
characteristic of qualitative assessment in THERP. 
Task decomposition is an information collection tool which is used to systematically expand 
upon the basic description of the activities which must be undertaken in each task element. 
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The starting point for a task decomposition is a set of clear task descriptions for all the task 
elements which are associated with a particular task, e.g. operational procedure. 
This task description must be written at a level of detail which is appropriate for the analyst’s 
purposes. 
These information can then be presented for each task element using an appropriate set of sub-
headings, so that the total information for each step is decomposed into a series of statements 
about limited aspects of the task. The sub-heading which are used to decompose the task 
elements must be specifically selected by the analyst according to the purpose of the particular 
investigation. 
The originator of decomposition methods for task analysis was probably Miller (1953), who 
suggested that each task element should be decomposed into the following categories: 
description, subtask, cues initiating action, controls used, typical errors, etc. 
However, this categorization does not cover all issues which might be of interest to an analyst, 
and so in order to address any other issues, it will be necessary to develop other decomposition 
categories. 
6.6 INTEGRATION OF THERP AND TASK ANALYSIS - CASE STUDY AT TRINITY 
COLLEGE OF DUBLIN 
A similar case study where a precise task analysis was required, was developed at Trinity 
College of Dublin (TCD). 
High voltage equipment is mostly designed according to technically prescriptive standards, 
requirements based on electrical engineering safety principles (e.g. CEI IEC 62271-202, High-
voltage switchgear and control gear, 2006). However a more risk-based approach to standards 
and regulation have been advisable to enable designer and user to take an active role in 
establishing that their installation is inherently safe. 
The use of Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) for instance is enabling the new substation to be 
housed indoors and condensed into around one quarter of the space. The manufacturers argue 
that design improvements in GIS make it virtually “maintenance free” and include: more 
compact GIS design, higher performance, etc. However some of these improvements have 
implications for the operators that need to be taken into account. A GIS more compact in fact 
often means having less space and awkward stations for the technicians during commissioning 
and maintenance actions. Commissioning, operational checks and inspections and the 
occasional maintenance interventions are activities during which the technicians need to 
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interface with the equipment, the issues regarding the interfaces provided have been analysed to 
identify their relevance in the overall risk assessment of the equipment. 
The scope of the present study is to verify trough a risk analysis the impacts that the issues 
related to deficit in ergonomic design may present for the overall availability and safety of the 
plant. Issues overlooked by both the technical standards and the designers. 
The Risk Assessment was performed using an ad hoc Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) template where the functional analysis included the human tasks as well as the 
technical aspects. 
6.6.1 Methodology  
The Risk Assessment was performed using an ad hoc Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) template where the functional analysis included the human tasks as well as the 
technical aspects. 
Further the Risk levels associated to each possible failure mode was obtained using the risk 
matrix proposed by the Military Standard MIL-STD-882. The overall method aimed at 
providing the assessment of a Risk Level similar to the Safety Integrity Level evaluation 
required by standards descending from IEC 61508 (originally developed for process plants, 
machineries and vehicles contain requirements and recommendations for validating safety-
related electrical, electronic and programmable control systems). 
The method would starts with a functional analysis of the equipment to identify all the relevant 
functions to be performed by the equipment or by an operator with the use of the equipment 
and the connected failure modes. Some of the failure modes can be determined assessing the 
Human Errors using the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) developed for 
the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Swain and Guttman in 1983. 
Information about the order of magnitude of the likelihoods of the events was obtained using 
equipment reliability data (when available) and THERP for relevant human errors. While the 
severity was assigned using expert judgment based on the severity classifications guidelines 
used by the Military Standard MIL-STD-882. 
The approach has proved to be flexible and it can be used at different levels of system detail. 
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Table 6: Template used for the analysis 
The first column identify the man-machine function, column (2) represents each task and sub 
task performed by the operator that involved a specific components of the GIS. 
The objective of column (3) is to consider the direct link between each task, for example in the 
template annexed to the document at Id 6.4.1 if the gas pressure is right the operator has to 
proceed with task Id 6.4.3 otherwise he has to refill the gas, Id 6.4.2. 
In the column (4) we have considered both the failure mode of the specific component involved 
in the task both the way making a wrong action of the operator. 
Columns (5) and (6) represent respectively the causes of human error and/or failure of device, 
and the effects of each error and failure mode on main item function. 
Columns (7) and (8) are duration of single action/task and how many times per year it is made. 
Likelihood (10), severity (11) are the quantitative elements of the analysis necessary to have an 
estimation of Risk (12). 
If presents the safeguard are indicated in column (9) and the last column (13) shows 
countermeasure to improve safety aspects. 
6.6.2 Application 
The study consisted of two parts: 
- Qualitative analysis  
- Quantitative analysis 
Only important actions have been modeled. 
The most significant issues detected by safety advisor of the company are related to 
commissioning and inspection/maintenance actions. 
For this reason the analysis was focused much more on these aspects, without neglecting the 
functional part related to normal operation of GIS which is the functional aspect considered by 
another FMEA performed on the equipment that was used as a benchmark. 
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Qualitative analysis 
In the first part of the analysis the objective was to fill in a detailed manner the first six 
columns of the template shown above (Table 6) and attached to the document (Annex 12.3). 
The phases of the analysis were: 
1. Decomposition of operation into component tasks considering the phases of commissioning, 
normal operations and inspections-maintenance (2)-(3) 
2. Identification of the key tasks (2) 
3. Identification of the failure modes for each of the component functions considered (4) 
4. Detection of causes and consequences of the relevant failure modes (5)-(6) 
The content of each boxes of the template was written in a synthetic and understandable form 
for staff working in the field that was subsequently involved in the quantitative analysis. 
Results from qualitative analysis  
The study shows that the most significant issues are:  
- limited and restrictive working areas; there is insufficient space to work on the installation 
safely; 
- the limited possibilities for applying forces; 
- the need for the technicians to work in fixed and awkward posture for sustained periods of 
time; 
- difficulty or complete inability of reading the metrological data; 
- slowdown in emergency procedure. 
Most of these issues are ergonomics aspects and they have an important relapse on reliability of 
the whole system and on the wellbeing of the operators. 
The bays of the substation are very close to each other and there is not enough space for the 
operator to access some of the equipment located in between the bays (e.g. it is nearly 
impossible to perform the gas test on some of the internal bays).  
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Figure 21: Position of the indicator (above 2mt. high and difficult to read in between bays) 
It seems that some basic principles of accessibility were not properly taken into account in the 
design of the equipment. The lack of basic ergonomics principle in design is reflected in the 
difficulties encountered by the operators to manually open or close the circuit breakers in case 
of failure of automatic activation. The risk is that the worker fails to resolve situation in time 
because he must reach the high position and turn the mechanism shaft in an awkward position 
and if the operation has to be performed for bays internally located the operator has to walk 
over the pipelines containing the live cables and the insulating Gas. No platforms were in fact 
provided to access those areas. 
 
Figure 22: Cables to be reached during commissioning and testing. The picture shows that they are positioned in a 
confined area accessing which the operator needs to maintain a crawling awkward position. 
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Figure 23: Operator trying to reach while standing on a ladder the manual gear to open the switch in case of failure of 
the automatic system for the side bay. 
The results of the first step of the analysis are confirmed and supported by a survey of users of 
GIS carried out by the Committee of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [34]. 
The survey highlights once again issues like: 
- constricted space for maintenance; 
- awkward accessibility of view ports; 
- difficulty to read SF6 gas pressure gauges. 
The ergonomic standard ISO 14738:2008 indicates the free space required for different 
dynamic body postures which may be used during maintenance with moderate force demands, 
If those indications are compared with some positions and force required in working area of 
GIS the dimensions seem to be underestimated. This can lead to serious musculoskeletal 
problems for the operator and could lead the worker to commit a mistake during the relevant 
commissioning, testing or recovery tasks he or she has to perform. 
 
Figure 24: Image taken from the ergonomic standard ISO 14738:2008 showing dimensions for kneeling and crawling 
positions. Unfortunately the height is not indicated. 
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Quantitative analysis 
Once the qualitative analysis was completed the next step was the semi-quantitative analysis 
that involved the columns (10) (11) (12) of the template (Table 6). 
For the quantification of the hazards in terms of severity of consequences and in terms of 
probability of occurrence, we have adopted the same approach proposed by the safety standard 
IEC 62061(Safety of machinery, Functional safety of safety-related electrical, electronic and 
programmable electronic control systems) with the purpose to follow the guide line used for 
electric and electronic equipment needed for safety related function as set by the safety 
integrity level concept proposed by the standard. 
To apply the hazard assessment matrix (Table 9) to evaluate if the risk is unacceptable or 
acceptable it was necessary to verify in what category of likelihood the numerical values, 
obtained from the quantitative analysis fell and combine it with the judgment on the category of 
severity for the consequences identified (Table 7 and Table 8 respectively).  To make the 
method more efficient and to justify the choice of range in which likelihood and severity of 
consequences fall, we have adopted the guide line proposed by the U.S. Military Standard 
MIL-STD-882. 
Hazard severity 
Category Name Characteristic 
I (4)* Catastrophic Death 
Loss of system 
II (3) Critical Severe injury or mortality 
Major damage to system 
III (2) Marginal Minor injury or mortality 
Minor damage to system 
IV (1) Negligible No injury or mortality (first aid) 
No damage to system 
*index for safety standard IEC 62061 
Table 7: Severity classification 
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Hazard likelihood 
Category Name Characteristic 
Probability ref. 
[event/y] 
A (5)* Frequent Likely to occur frequently Occurred several times in the last 5 years in the 
company. 
> 10-1 
B (4) Probable Will occur several times in life  
of a component. Has occurred in the company. 
10-1 to 10-3 
C (3) Occasional Likely to occur sometimes in life of a 
component. 
Has occurred more than once in the industry. 
< 10-3 
D (2) Remote Unlikely but possible to occur in life of a 
component. Has occurred in the industry. No 
damage to system 
< 10-4 
E (1) Improbable Occurrence may not be experienced. 
Never occurred in the industry 
< 10-6 
*index for safety standard IEC 62061  
Table 8: Likelihood classification 
Hazard Assessment Matrix and Hazard Risk Index 
Frequency  
of occurrence 
Hazard severity 
I 
Catastrophic
II 
Critical 
III 
Marginal 
IV 
Negligible 
A - Frequent IA IIA IIIA IVA 
B - Probable IB IIB IIIB IVB 
C - Occasional IC IIC IIIC IVC 
D - Remote ID IID IIID IVD 
E - Improbable IE IIE IIIE IVE 
RI 1 Unacceptable 
RI 2 Undesirable (management decision required) 
RI 3 Acceptable with review by management 
RI4 Acceptable without review 
Table 9: Categories used to define the class of risk 
The quantitative analysis required to identify the likelihood and consequences related to a 
variety of events like failure mode of the electrical components, human error, “falls from 
ladders”, etc. and for this reason these values have been obtained from different sources. 
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Failure rate of electrical device were provided by reliability data of the manufacturer or through 
GESCOM data base related to reliability of the components of the Italian electricity grid 
provided by CESI’s report [37]. In this last case the value was not related to each single 
component but it refers to the whole system; from the MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) it was 
possible to obtain the respective failure rate using the following relation: λ/1=MTTF . 
Likelihood of events like “falls from ladders” derives from expert judgment and from records 
of worker’s injury reported by the company involved in the analysis [36]. 
The failure rate values associated to human error were obtained through the application of 
THERP model. 
THERP (Technique for Human error Rate Prediction) is a method to predict human error 
probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be caused by 
human errors alone or in connection with equipment functioning, operational procedures and 
practices, or other system and human characteristics that influence system behavior. 
THERP requires the analyst to determine whether the error to be examined is one of omission, 
one of commission, or diagnosis and sources of operator burden include the following: 
• time constraints 
• diagnosis 
• decision making command and control  
• physiological factors 
The data for human error probability (HEP) in THERP tables referred to the assumption of a 
lognormal distribution for the human error probability density function (truncated in 0 and 1). 
In the tables two values are reported: the median of the distribution and error factor.  From this 
two values the mean value for the lognormal distribution is obtained to be used for assessing 
the final HEP. 
Example value for THERP Table 20-12 (13)  
003.0%50 ==
z
eX µ  
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z
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Every HEP obtained from the lognormal distribution were reported on the table (Table 10) used 
for the assessment (The complete table is in the Annex 12.3). 
Item n° Subtask description for 
HRA-MAN 
Mean HEP Stress 
level/ergonomic 
constraints* 
Source 
THERP 
table 
Modified 
HEP 
Total 
HEP 
2.1.1 Operator wrong wiring 
choosing the wrong cable. 
1.12E-02 1 20-12 (13) 1.12E-02 1.12E-02 
2.2 Operator cannot see the 
indicator. 
3.75E-03 10 20-10 (1) 3.75E-02 
4.37E-02 2.2 Check heater and 
thermostats are working 
omitted. 
1.25E-03 5 20-7 (3) 6.25E-03 
2.3.1 Visual and physical check if 
the manual opening and 
closing of the earth switch is 
inhibited when the circuit 
breaker is in a closed 
position omitted. 
1.25E-03 10 20-14 (1) 1.25E-02 1.25E-02 
Table 10: Extract of THERP table for subtask 2.1.1, 2.2 and 2.3.1 
Each mean HEP was modified by the effects of stress and experience level in case of 
emergency conditions, and in the other cases it was changed to take into account the ergonomic 
constraints (THERP table 20-16).  
For those ergonomic constraints that completely prevent the job from being effectively carried 
out it was assigned factor 10, for those constraints that could force the operator to err a 
multiplication of a factor 5 was used. In some cases it was chosen to use the upper bound level, 
the 95th percentile HEP of lognormal distribution, to consider the worst case in a conservative 
manner (e.g. The gas sampling and testing procedures for instance has to be carried out in very 
adverse conditions where the location of some of the sample points between bays make it 
nearly impossible for the operator to reach and use them). 
The likelihood obtained in the above cases was also discounted to take into account the actual 
timeframe over which certain tasks are carried out in the life period of the equipment (e.g. 
commissioning is 1/ 30 years, where 30 years is the expected life duration of the equipment, 
and Maintenance interventions 1/5 years). 
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Results from quantitative analysis 
The analysis was able to identify two types of consequences: 
1) the impact of ergonomic constraints on the operator, and its safety 
2) the loss of primary functions of the plant, the loss of efficiency, the possible disruption to 
customers, etc. 
It is important to notice that using the new approach to functional analysis the FMEA was able 
to take into account more functions and related failure than the ones normally considered for 
similar equipment. 
The hazard risk index for each failure mode fell into two different classes: 
One is unacceptable (Risk index 1), this index was usually obtained for cases where the 
ergonomics constraints made it nearly impossible for the operator to effectively carry out 
his/her task. The other risk index commonly obtained (Risk Index 2) refers to undesirable 
situations where the operation is possible but awkward to perform such that the operator may 
be more easily induced to make mistakes. In those cases the consequences are severe both for 
the operator safety and for the plant efficiency.  
In case of undesirable risk, management decision is required. Annex 1 contains a summary of 
the results obtained for the risk Assessment of the GIS with all the failure modes leading to a 
risk index 1 or 2. 
The template used for TCD’s case study has proved a useful mean and was applied to generate 
the input file for the logical model in IDDA approach. 
7. PROPOSED FINAL APPROACH 
There are two crucial aspects related to modelling man-machine interaction in Quantitative 
Risk Analysis (QRA) context: 
1. the need to insert human interaction in the logical model of QRAs techniques; 
2. the quantification of effect of human interaction. 
The modelling of inappropriate behaviours of human being is the “malfunction” of  behaviours 
of operators. 
As happens in general QRA , the analysis related to human-machine interaction  in a reliability 
study are of two types: qualitative and quantitative. 
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The qualitative analysis is oriented to define the typologies of inappropriate behaviours and to 
study the systemic and environmental conditions that encouraged and influenced them. 
The objective of quantitative analysis is to define the probability of each wrong action and the 
consequences of accident sequences related to them. 
Usually human-machine interactions are represented through logical binary states, 
success/failure, and human errors are modelled as omitted actions provided by procedures.  
Other mode of failure, like inappropriate actions originated by representation errors, wrong 
reasoning  or by misdiagnosis, that produce an intersection of different accident scenarios,  are 
not specifically identified. These inappropriate actions are identified as error of commission 
and are more and more important in the human factor study in QRA. 
To take into account methodology able to include in a formal way human and programmatic 
errors is essential to develop advanced QRA. 
In literature different methodologies of human reliability exist and for this study the most 
appropriate method was THERP for two reasons: the former because it was effectively applied 
in the case study of Dublin, the latter because this methodology is strongly linked to data base 
in which are contained the data derived from a series of information obtained experimentally 
and from experts elicitation  (chapter 6 paragraph 6.6.1). 
7.1 COMBINATION OF TASK ANALYSIS, IDDA AND THERP 
The proposed model is designed precisely with the aim of transferring the I.D.D.A. philosophy 
to the in-depth study of the deviations which may occur during human implementation of 
operational procedures. 
To do that it was necessary to identify useful methodology deal with human factors. 
The large database based on real data, coupled with the fact that the THERP is strongly 
oriented to engineering analysis of human errors, led to choose this method. 
Once identified the machine’s behavior and the possible malfunction in which this can fall, 
with relatives influence for the operator, it was necessary to develop a detailed analysis of 
procedure to be performed, identifying all possible operator’s error and omission. 
A good task analysis was important requirement for the implementation of input file in 
I.D.D.A. software. 
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7.1.1 A real example to define e new embedded methodology 
The new embedded methodology was applied to the procedure for the use of a press including 
setting of the equipment, functional check and processing material during normal use of the 
machine. 
For a good and complete task analysis a similar template used in the case study related to Gas 
Insulated Switchgear was implemented (Table 11 and Annex 12.4). 
Id. Man-Machine function Link to Failure mode Causes Consequences 
            
1 Work on the press (only one operator)   -     
1.1 Setting of the 
equipment 1.1.2 
Operation by two instead of one 
person Wrong operation mode 
Increase probability of injury for the 
operator 
1.1.2 Check area is clear of tools   
If clear 
1.1.4, if 
not clear  
1.1.3 
Omission (operator doesn't 
check), some operator left some 
tool in dangerous zone 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction 
from a formal or ad hoc 
procedure, lack of 
concern 
Increase probability of injury for the 
operator 
Table 11: Template related to procedure using of Hydraulic press 
In this specific case study the failure mode and causes related to the failure are extrapolated, in 
many cases, from the BGIA study (Chapter 5 paragraph 5.2.1). 
7.1.2 Implementation of general model 
Once task analysis has been created the second step was to prepare the Input File finalized to 
run the I.D.D.A. program.   
The task analysis related to use of press has been described with I.D.D.A.’s syntax: 
1.  Identification of the events related to the operation of the system itself and construction of a 
list of levels, with questions and affirmations, which represents the elementary matter of the 
logical model and also the nodes in the event tree.  
2.  Construction of a ‘reticulum’ indicating the addresses (subsequent level) to be visit after 
each response in each level, and a comment string that allows the user to read the logical 
development of a sequence.  
3.  Association to each of the levels of a probability, which represents the expectation degree of 
the failure or unwanted event and of an uncertainty ratio, which represents the distribution.  
4.  Definition of all the constraints, which can modify run time the model, fitting it to the 
current knowledge status. 
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8. APPLICATION 
Once defined the structure of the new methodology, it was applied to the case study related to 
the hydraulic press. 
The task analysis was implemented on the bases of the operating procedure for the use of the 
machinery. 
The ad hoc template was filled evaluating the failure modes for each interaction between man 
and machinery. These failures could be related to both devices and human error. 
After completing the task analysis it was possible to implement the source file to run it with the 
I.D.D.A. program.  
8.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOURCE FILE 
The problem has to be reproduced in the program to aim at developing constituents, and 
alternative sequences, in a clear, unambiguous and complete way. 
The problem has to be represented with a series of questions related to the occurrence or not of 
the subsequent random events. The questions have to be accompanied by the possible 
consequences, on the subsequent events, of the response that they receive out of the hypothesis. 
Every random event is fully characterised by these fundamental elements: 
- Identification number  
- Probability assigned to the event 
- Two integers. The first represents the number of the random event that follows in the 
sequence the question in case of success, the second represents the subsequent question in 
case of failure. 
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The syntax of file source presents this form:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What has been written represents the trellis on which to move the logical questions, but it is 
lacking in both logical and probabilistic conditioning which are necessary for the full definition 
of the system. 
In this case we have used logical conditioning known as of second type and conditional 
probability of first type.  
8.1.1 Syntax of logical conditioning of second type 
The need to relate the probability of success or failure of different actions, gives rise to one of 
the fundamental problems of human reliability analysis is the determination of dependency 
relationships. 
This type of conditioning defined the determination of success or failure of the action referred 
by the question or of the following logical events in case of success or failure relevant to the 
previous questions or logic levels.  
The syntax is given by a sequence of two integers. 
These integers start with 1 or 2 depending on whether the conditioning is caused by the success 
or failure of the event. The second integer is odd, if the conditioning of the conditioned event is 
on success and even if it is on failure. 
:Setting of the equipment number of operators required is one 
1 0.03 0. 10 145 3 'Num op.' 'one' 'more than one' 
:Check area is clear of tools 
10 0.0125 0. 15 150 3 'Op. checks' 'yes' 'no' 
20 100 0.004 1 
:Presence of tools in dangerous area 
15 0.0048 0. 25 20 3 'Area free' 'yes' 'no' 
:Clean dangerous area 
20 0.0125 0. 25 150 3 'Op. cleaned' 'yes' 'no' 
20 100 0.004 1 
:Put press on intermittently command 
25 0.00133 0. 30 150 3 'Op. correct button' 'yes' 'no‘ 
… 
ID LEVEL 
PROBABILITY 
DESCRIPTION 
FOLLOWING ADDRESS 
54 
 
We show the example where if the operator comes into contact with tools and suffers a damage 
(2= “yes, upper limb amputation”), the program must stop with "Operator injured" (3= “yes, 
operator injured”) (Annex 12.5). 
:Dynamics of injury for the operator 
170 0.37 0. 190 190 3 'Upper limb amputation' 'no' 'yes' 
14 190 0 0 
23 190 0 0 
:Injury to the operator 
190 1 0. 0 0 3 'Op. injured' 'yes' 'no' 
8.1.2 SYNTAX OF PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONING OF FIRST TYPE 
The need to relate the probability of success or failure of different actions, gives rise to one of 
the fundamental problems of human reliability analysis is the determination of dependency 
relationships. 
To take into account this concept in the source file, we used the probabilistic conditioning of 
first type. 
The syntax is given by a series of two integers and two real numbers. 
The first integer represents the statement that if the conditioning event is on success or failure 
the conditional probability of a subsequent event has to be changed. 
The second integer coincides with number of conditioned event. The real number provides the 
new probability to assigned to the conditioned event. 
We report an example where the operator doesn’t clean the tools area and introduces the raw 
material to form the metal sheet. In this case it will be more likely that operator suffers  injuries 
or that the metal sheet is not properly positioned.  
 :Presence of tools in dangerous area 
15 0.0048 0. 25 20 3 'Area free' 'yes' 'no' 
:Clean dangerous area 
20 0.0125 0. 25 150 3 'Op. cleaned' 'yes' 'no' 
20    100    0.0035 1  
… 
:Put metal sheet in fixture 
       100 0.003 0. 105 150 3 'M. sheet properly positioned' 'yes' 'no'  
To fix the new increased value of probability an operational sensible choice was made. We based 
the choice on statistical data where it was possible. The increase was around 10%.  
The probability variation is 
required by the failure of 
conditioning event. New probability assigned to the 
event identified with “100”. 
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If it were possible to obtain more precise data it would be quick to change the data within the 
structure of the source file. 
8.2 APPLICATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR THE DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUENTS 
The quantitative analysis required to identify the likelihood related to failure mode of different 
elements like electrical components, human error, implemented in each level of source file; for this 
reason these values have been obtained from different sources. 
Failure rate of electrical device were provided by reliability data of the manufacturer or calculated 
trough the theory of technical standard EN IEC 62061.  
The failure rate values associated to human error were obtained through the application of THERP 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Below we show in which way the value of Human Error Probability of level number 37 was 
obtained: 
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The source program was played back and we obtained all possible top events and their probability 
of occurrence. 
Data references extracted 
from THERP table. 
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At this point in order to assign the SIL to the safety function, for example the light barrier, it has 
been necessary to make a selection and applying certain conditions to extract only the probability of 
occurrence of injury associated with failure of the barrier or with by-pass of the device. 
To do this we applied the IDDA function (SPELSXP) to select the constituents that involve a given 
top event and in this specific case “Operator injured”. 
A matrix was built to communicate to the program the conditions to search. 
The events that have to be present in the same time must be written in the same row; on the contrary 
if the elementary events are “in OR”, they must be written  in a different row. 
CONDITIONS (The same ROW=AND the same COLUMN=OR) 
Examining the case of light barrier the simultaneous conditions are “Operator injured” and “light 
barrier not intervenes”. The conditions in OR will be the events that explain why the light barrier 
could not intervene: “Operator omits to recovery safe guards”, “Operator doesn’t recover safe 
guards in correct position” or “Operator by-pass the safety device”. 
At the end the matrix presents a shape of this type: 
        CONDIZIONI (stessa RIGA = AND  stessa  COLONNA = OR) 
   190,P  -140,P   -65,P      
   190,P  -140,P   -67,P  
   190,P  -140,P   107,P  
        COSTITUENTI ESAMINATI   :       3650 
        COSTITUENTI SELEZIONATI :      2340 
 
In this way, 2340 constituents were found. Each probability of these constituents has been 
calculated and added together to obtain cumulative probability. 
This probability can be associated to the probability of dangerous failure expressed in the technical 
standard. 
Once obtained the cumulative probability, it was necessary to translate it into a numerical index to 
apply the matrix of technical standard EN IEC 62061, thereby carrying out the assignment of the 
level of integrity required for light barrier.  
To justify the choice of the category in which the probability of occurrence of injury falls we have 
used the guidelines provided by the U.S. Military Standard MIL-STD-882 (Table 12). 
We have obtained a probability of occurrence equal to 2.7*10-2 and we have associated this value to 
category B.  
 
 
MATRIX 
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                 E L E N C O     T O T A L E     C U T - S E T S 
N. COSTIT.  CUT MINIMO    ORDINE CUT       PROBABILITA'   CUMULATA 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
       1          0           2              4.352E-03      
       2          0           2              4.292E-03      
       3          0           2              2.775E-03      
      … 
2340    1144          11             7.697E-32      
                                             --------- 
             PROBABILITA' CUMULATA CUT-SETS  2.718E-02 
Category 
(Cl) Name  Characteristic  
Probability 
ref. [event/y]  
A (14-15)  Frequent Likely to occur frequently  Occurred several times in the last 5 years in the 
company.  
> 10-1 
B (11-13)  Probable Will occur several times in life  
of a component. Has occurred in the company.  
10-1 to 10-3 
C (8-10)  Occasional Likely to occur sometimes in life of a component.  
Has occurred more than once in the industry.  
< 10-3 
D (5-7)  Remote Unlikely but possible to occur in life of a component. 
Has occurred in the industry. No damage to system  
< 10-4 
E (3-4)  Improbable Occurrence may not be experienced.  
Never occurred in the industry  
< 10-6 
Table 12: Classification of probability according to U.S. Military standard 
The severity of injuries in case of contact between the operator and tools is critical so that the index 
will be equal to 4 (Table 13). 
Severity Name Characteristic 
3/4 Critical Severe injury or mortality 
Major damage to system 
2 Marginal Minor injury or mortality 
Minor damage to system 
1 Negligible No injury or mortality (first aid) 
No damage to system 
Table 13: Severity classification 
Once identified likelihood and severity of consequences (Table 12 and Table 13), applying the 
matrix of risk (Table 14) allowed to assign “Operational SIL” to the safety function represented by 
light barrier taking into account the human factors from the beginning of the analysis. 
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Severity 
(Se) 
Class (Cl) 
3-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-15 
4 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3 
3  (OM) SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
2   (OM) SIL 1 SIL 2 
1    (OM) SIL 1 
Table 14: Matrix for the assignment of SIL 
From the application of matrix we obtained SIL equal to three for the light barrier. This means that 
the architecture of the device has to ensure at least the level 3 of availability.   
8.3 SIL COMPUTATION FOR LIGHT BARRIER TROUGH THE NEW APPROACH 
To verify that the Safety-related Electrical Control System satisfies a Safety Integrity Level equal to 
three it was built a new source file that takes into account only the light barrier evaluating all the 
ways it can fail or be by-passed by the operator. 
Unlike the source files built in the previous part the objective of analysis is to discover if the device 
will be available or not when it is called upon to intervene as shown in the level 40 in the source 
file. 
:Light barrier 
1 0.0000000911 0. 10 40 3 'l.b. works' 'yes' 'no' 
24 40 0 0 
 
:Recovery of the safe guards 
10 0.000039 0. 20 40 3 'Op. restores the safe guards' 'yes' 'Op. omits' 
24 40 0 0 
 
:Recovery of the safe guards in correct position 
20 0.000069 0. 30 40 3 'Correct distance transmitter and receiver' 'yes' 'no' 
24 40 0 0 
 
:By-pass the device 
30 0.00077 0. 40 40 3 'Op.no by-passes device' 'yes' 'no' 
13 40 0 0 
24 40 0 0 
 
:Availability of light barrier 
40 1 0. 0 0 3 'l.b. available' 'yes' 'no' 
Running the source file we obtained five constituents and also in this case we are interested only in 
the Top Event: “Light barrier is not available”. 
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For this reason we applied again the function SPELSXP to select the desired T.E. In this way we 
obtained four constituents. 
        NOME DEL FILE SORGENTE  : P8lbf.INP      
        NOME DEL FILE DI OUT    : RIS5lbf.OUT    
        Livello Iniziale        :    1 
        NOME FILE PUNTATORI     : RIS5lbf.PUN    
  
        TIPO della SELEZIONE    : g 
        NOME FILE OUTPUT        : RIS8lbfs.PUN   
        NOME FILE COMPLEMENTARE : RIS8lbfe.PUN   
  
        CONDIZIONI (stessa RIGA = AND  stessa  COLONNA = OR) 
        -40,P     0,      0,      0,      0,      0,0     0,0     0,0     0,0     0,0 
  
        COSTITUENTI ESAMINATI   :         5 
        COSTITUENTI SELEZIONATI :       4 
It means that in four cases the light barrier fails with a certain probability. The sum of the four 
probabilities gives the cumulative probability.  
At this point it is possible to verify if the cumulative probability falls in the interval of probability 
related to SIL three; if it is included in that interval it satisfies the requirement previously requested 
(Table 15). 
SIL PFH 
3 ≥ 10-9 to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
Table 15: Correspondence between SIL and probability of dangerous failure 
The following figures shows the selected constituents and then computation of the cumulative 
probability. 
EVENTO  ris8lbfs.PUN    della PARTIZIONE  ris8lbf.OUT    
  
        --------------------------- 
        COSTITUENTE Numero :      1 
  
   1  l.b. wor yes       +       1.-9.11E-08                         1.00E+00 
  10  Op. rest yes       +       1.-3.90E-05                         1.00E+00 
  20  Correct  yes       +       1.-6.90E-05                         1.00E+00 
  30  Op.no by no        -          7.70E-04                         7.70E-04 
  40  l.b. ava no        - V        1.00E+00                         7.70E-04 
  
                                           PROBABILITA' uguale a  :  7.70E-04 
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        COSTITUENTE Numero :      2 
  
   1  l.b. wor yes       +       1.-9.11E-08                         1.00E+00 
  10  Op. rest yes       +       1.-3.90E-05                         1.00E+00 
  20  Correct  no        -          6.90E-05                         6.90E-05 
  40  l.b. ava no        - V        1.00E+00                         6.90E-05 
  
                                           PROBABILITA' uguale a  :  6.90E-05 
        --------------------------- 
        COSTITUENTE Numero :      3 
  
   1  l.b. wor yes       +       1.-9.11E-08                         1.00E+00 
  10  Op. rest Op. omit  -          3.90E-05                         3.90E-05 
  40  l.b. ava no        - V        1.00E+00                         3.90E-05 
  
                                           PROBABILITA' uguale a  :  3.90E-05 
        --------------------------- 
        COSTITUENTE Numero :      4 
  
   1  l.b. wor no        -          9.11E-08                         9.11E-08 
  40  l.b. ava no        - V        1.00E+00                         9.11E-08 
  
                                           PROBABILITA' uguale a  :  9.11E-08 
   
 
 
                E L E N C O     T O T A L E     C U T - S E T S 
 
  
 N. COSTIT.  CUT MINIMO    ORDINE CUT       PROBABILITA'   CUMULATA   
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
  
       1          0           1              7.699E-04     87.69E+00 % 
       2          0           1              6.900E-05     95.55E+00 % 
       3          0           1              3.900E-05     99.99E+00 % 
       4          0           1              9.110E-08     10.00E+01 % 
                                             --------- 
             PROBABILITA' CUMULATA CUT-SETS  8.780E-04 
                                              
   SIL PFH 
3 ≥ 10-9 to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
 
We verified that cumulative probability is 8.78*10-4 ensuring a Safety Integrity Level lower than 
that assigned. This highlights the fact that although the architecture of the light barrier was 
characterised by a high reliability the human factor affects the final result in a very significant way. 
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9.  CONCLUSIONS 
The new value calculated with the integrated approach is comparable with the value obtained 
by mere qualitative risk analysis suggested by the technical standard EN IEC 62061. 
Once the value of probability, calculated with the new methodological approach, has been 
converted in the index of probability, the range in which it falls is the same as the standard 
method.  
It is clear however that the Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis permits a construction of the 
problem much more detailed and accurate, allowing to take into consideration also the 
important aspect related to man-machine interface. 
This first important result highlights that taking into account the human factor in the 
assignment of SIL (Operational SIL) is likely to imply the request of a very high level of 
reliability of the component when it has a very high importance from the point of view of 
operator’s safety. In fact this new methodological approach has great importance when the 
interaction between human being and machinery is strong, less into the field of large automatic 
plants. 
Furthermore, the probability of dangerous failure (PDF) of the light barrier calculated trough 
IDDA results significantly higher than the probability linked exclusively to the device 
architecture. This could mean that the reliability of the architecture of the system was 
previously overestimated and that probably the design of the light barrier is not sufficient to 
ensure that the operator does not commit wrong actions. 
On the whole, this study shows that more exhaustive evaluation is necessary and that the 
interface between the operator and the equipment cannot be neglected.  
To improve the safety for the operator the best approach will be:  
- to have a strong commitment; 
- to increase the training of the employee particularly on the job; 
- to implement the operational procedure; 
- to increase the protection level of intrinsic safety of the electrical devices. 
To take into account this conclusions and to comply with the previous analyzed technical 
standard it is necessary to assess the human factors trough a detailed task analysis. This tool has 
to describe every elementary action that the operator performs. For each action the analyst 
identifies the possible error of commission or of omission that the operator is likely to commit. 
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Once identified the correct sequence of tasks and the likely failure modes, the analyst is able to 
implement the source file to apply the Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA). 
Including particular conditions into the file for the subsequent application (SPELSXP) allows 
to select the events that involve the safety function that one wants to analyze, as explained 
during the application in chapter 8. In this way it is possible to obtain a cumulative probability 
that, when converted into an index of probability, permits to assign the Operational Safety 
Integrity Level to the Safety-related Electrical Control Systems (Table 14, chapter 8).  
At this point the last phase will be to verify if the physical safety device applied to the 
machinery complies with the Operational SIL assigned in the previous way using once again 
the IDDA approach (chapter 8, paragraph 8.3). 
If the SIL calculated in the last step corresponds with the one previously assigned, the SRECS 
will be considered reliable also in case of a hypothetical wrong behavior of the operator and the 
goal will be reached. Otherwise it will be necessary to carry out a failure reduction analysis and 
to repeat the analysis. 
To have a correct methodological approach to take into account human factors is useful also to 
have evidence where a safety device could fail. It is difficult for engineers to change human 
nature and therefore, it is indispensable to try to remove opportunities for error by changing the 
work situation: so it is possible to change the plant or equipment design or the method of 
working. Alternatively, it is possible to mitigate the consequences of error or provide 
opportunities for recovery. 
It is important to remind that safety analysis should interest all people involved, not only 
engineers, but also all those who work in, as designers, users and producers. 
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10. SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONS 
 APM:  Automatic Protective Means 
CCF:  Common Cause Failure 
CPC:  Common Performance Condition 
CTA:                 Cognitive Task Analysis 
DRV:  Driver 
EF:  Error Factor 
EFC:  Error Forcing Context 
EI:            Erroneous Intervention 
EIPM:  Erroneous Intervention Protective Means 
EPC:   Error Producing Condition 
ESF:  Engineered Safety Features  
ET:  Event Tree  
FMEA:           Failure Modes & Effects Analysis 
FO:  Field Operator 
FT:  Fault Tree 
HAZOP:           Hazard and Operability 
HEP:  Human Error Probability 
HF:  Human Factors 
HFE:  Human Failure Event 
HFI:  Human Failure Identification 
H&OF:           Human and Organisational Factors 
HRA:  Human Reliability Analysis 
HRA-ET            Human Reliability Analysis Event Tree 
HTA:  Hierarchical Task Analysis 
INH:  Inhibit 
IROA:  Integrated Recursive Operability Analysis  
IDDA                 Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis 
MI:           Missing Intervention 
MMI:  Man Machine Interaction 
MPM:  Manual Protective Mean 
OAT:  Operator Action Tree  
P&ID:  Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
PRA:  Probability Risk Assessment  
PSFs:  Performing Shaping Factors 
RHOA:           Recursive Human Operability Analysis 
ROA:  Recursive Operability Analysis 
SAD   Strategy-Action-Diagnosis 
SLI   Success Likelihood Index 
SRK:  Skill Rule Knowledge 
64 
 
TA:  Task Analysis 
TDO:  Technical Department Operator 
TE:  Top Event 
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12. ANNEX 
12.1  ANNEX: HAZID  TEPMLATE 
N° Fasi 
Pericolo 
Deviazione 
Cause Conseguenze 
F 
D R 
Pr Av Fr 
1. Montaggio/Sollevamento    
   
  
1.1 Aggancio pressa ai quattro 
attacchi 
Mancato aggancio  Dimenticanza 
dell’operatore 
OR 
Nodi realizzati in modo 
scorretto 
Nessuna conseguenza 
pericolosa per la salute e 
sicurezza del lavoratore 2 1 1 1 4 
1.2 Sollevamento della pressa 
per appoggiarla su travi di 
legno 
Caduta dall’alto Errato ancoraggio 
Utilizzo sistema di 
sollevamento con portata 
inferiore al peso della 
macchina 
Traumi dovuti a 
schiacciamento 
3 1 1 2 10 
1.3  Messa in bolla della pressa Scorretto livellamento 
della macchina per errato 
settaggio delle viti di 
livellamento 
Errore dell’operatore 
Rottura di una o più viti di 
livellamento 
Superficie di appoggio non 
uniforme 
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina se 
inclinata. 1 1 1 1 3 
2. Installazione         
2.1 Allacciamento elettrico         
2.1.1 
Collegamento interruttore 
generale con un cavo 
tripolare + terra 
Contatto diretto con 
elementi in tensione 
Contatto indiretto con 
elementi che entrano in 
tensione in condizioni di 
guasto. 
Contatto con la massa sotto 
tensione (massa va a terra) Folgorazione 3 1 1 4 20 
2.1.2 
Messa a terra fissando 
all’apposito morsetto una 
corda nuda posto nelle 
vicinanze dell’interruttore 
generale 
Contatto indiretto con 
elementi che entrano in 
tensione in condizioni di 
guasto. 
La massa va in tensione Folgorazione 3 1 1 4 20 
2.1.3 
Collegamento cavi elettrici 
dei pulsanti e dei dispositivi 
di protezione elettrica come 
da progetto e schemi allegati 
 
Cortocircuito Contatto indebito tra i 
conduttori 
I dispositivi di 
protezione non 
intervengono  
3 1 1 3 15 
2.2 Allacciamento acqua per 
sistema di raffreddamento         
2.2.1 Installazione sistema di 
raffreddamento Mancato allacciamento Errore operatore 
Mancato raffreddamento 
con  surriscaldamento 
dei circuiti idraulici e 
della macchina 
2 1 1 1 4 
2.3 Riempimento serbatoio olio idraulico         
2.3.1 
Apertura serbatoio per 
controllarne il grado di 
pulizia 
 
Contatto con olio Errore dell’operatore Irritazione della pelle 
3 1 2 2 12 
2.3.2 Chiusura serbatoio Errata chiusura del 
serbatoio Errore dell’operatore 
Funzionamento 
degradato della 
macchina 
OR 
3 1 1 1 5 
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N° Fasi 
Pericolo 
Deviazione 
Cause Conseguenze 
F 
D R 
Pr Av Fr 
La macchina non parte 
2.3.3 
Riempimento serbatoio a 
serbatoio chiuso attraverso il 
bocchettone di carico 
posizionato sul coperchio del 
serbatoio 
Rovesciamento di olio 
idraulico 
OR 
Riempimento con olio non 
idoneo 
Errore dell’operatore 
 
 
Errore dell’operatore 
Formazione di chiazze 
d’olio sul pavimento e 
rischio scivolamento 
 
Introduzione nel circuito 
oleodinamico di corpi 
estranei accidentalmente 
contenuti nell’olio 
OR 
Rottura della macchina 
3 1 2 2 12 
2.3.4 
Lubrificazione guide 
scorrimento del piano mobile 
della pressa 
Gocciolamento olio 
idraulico Errore operatore 
Formazione di chiazze 
d’olio sul pavimento e 
rischio scivolamento 
4 1 1 1 6 
3. Messa in funzione/Avviamento         
3.1 
Controllo corrispondenza 
collegamenti elettrici fatti 
con il progetto 
Collegamenti di versi da 
quelli indicai nel progetto Errore installatore 
La macchina non parte 
OR 
Azionamento comandi 
incontrollato  
2 1 1 1 4 
3.2 Accensione macchina Mancata accensione della 
macchina 
Mancanza E.E. 
OR 
Collegamenti elettrici non 
corretti 
La macchina non si 
avvia, mancata 
produzione 
2 1 1 1 4 
4. Funzionamento/Ciclo di lavorazione         
4.1 Messa a punto degli utensili         
4.1.1 
 
Posizionamento dello stampo 
idoneo al tipo di lavorazione 
da eseguire 
 
Contatto con utensile  
 
Avviamento intempestivo 
della macchina 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione arti 
superiori 
3 3 4 4 40 
Caduta per gravità della 
trave che trattiene il 
punzone per un guasto del 
sistema idraulico, per un 
guasto meccanico o per un 
guasto del sistema di 
controllo elettrico 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione arti 
superiori 
3 1 4 4 32 
4.1.2 Posizionamento sullo stampo della dima di centraggio 
Contatto con utensile 
(punzone) 
Avviamento intempestivo 
della macchina 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione arti 
superiori 
3 1 4 3 24 
Caduta per gravità della 
trave che trattiene il 
punzone per un guasto del 
sistema idraulico, per un 
guasto meccanico o per un 
guasto del sistema di 
controllo elettrico 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione arti 
superiori 
3 1 4 3 24 
4.2.  Alimentazione e 
caricamento materie prime         
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N° Fasi 
Pericolo 
Deviazione 
Cause Conseguenze 
F 
D R 
Pr Av Fr 
4.2.1 
Inserimento pezzo di acciaio 
da lavorare  
(manuale) 
Contatto con utensile 
(punzone) 
Avviamento intempestivo 
della macchina causa errata 
posizione del contatto di 
sicurezza 
 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione arti 
superiori 
3 3 5 4 44 
4.3 Lavorazione materiale (produzione)         
4.3.1 
Selezione del ciclo di lavoro 
con  regolazione o verifica 
dei parametri funzionali della 
macchina 
Errato settaggio del ciclo di 
lavoro 
Errore operatore Potenziali situazioni di 
pericolo es. proiezione di 
materiale verso 
l’operatore 
2 1 5 2 16 
4.3.2 
Azionamento dispositivo di 
doppio comando ad azione 
mantenuta (oss. Non è più 
ammesso per la produzione 
UNI EN 12622:2003, solo 
per fasi di setting come la 
messa a punto degli utensili, 
corse di prova, manutenzione 
e lubrificazione) 
Avviamento accidentale 
Guasto contattore, tutti i 
contatti rimangono in 
posizione eccitata quando 
la bobina è diseccitata. 
OR 
Errore operatore  
OR  
una terza persona aziona il 
comando senza di 
accorgersi del collega che 
ha le mani nella macchina 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione arti 
superiori 
3 3 5 4 44 
4.3.2
.1 
Esecuzione del ciclo di 
produzione 
Caduta per gravità 
accidentale della trave 
durante la produzione 
Guasto del sistema 
idraulico 
Guasto meccanico 
Guasto del sistema 
comando elettrico 
Lesioni arti superiori 2 1 5 3 24 
4.3.2
.2 Muting Contatto con gli strumenti  
Guasto del circuito 
oleodinamico Lesioni arti superiori 3 3 4 3 30 
4.3.3 Disattivazione macchina a fine ciclo 
Mancato funzionamento 
del fine corsa elettrico 
Guasto del dispositivo di 
fine corsa per mancata 
apertura dei contatti 
Schiacciamento arti 
superiori 4 1 5 3 30 
5. Servizi         
5.1  Energia elettrica Mancanza energia elettrica Interruzione dalla rete Arresto improvviso della 
macchina 3 1 5 1 9 
5.2 Acqua per sistema di 
raffreddamento  
Mancanza acqua 
OR 
Raffreddamento 
insufficiente 
Mancanza acqua da rete 
OR 
Mancato funzionamento 
dello scambiatore calore 
causa tubi dell’acqua 
incrostati 
OR  
Mancato collegamento a 
rete idrica 
 
Surriscaldamento della 
macchina 
1 1 1 1 3 
6.  Sistemi protettivi         
6.1 Doppi pulsanti di discesa con 
dispositivo di simultaneità 
congiuntamente ad una bassa 
velocità di chiusura 
Contatto 
indebito/cortocircuito 
OR 
Guasto attuatore 
Avviamento accidentale 
della macchina 
 
 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione dita e mani 3 1 5 4 36 
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6.2 Barra di protezione con 
dispositivo di sicurezza 
elettro-pneumatico 
Mancato intervento della 
barra di protezione 
Guasto del dispositivo di 
sicurezza 
Mancata interruzione 
della discesa del piano 
mobile della pressa 
3 1 5 2 18 
6.3 Pulsante di emergenza 
pressa, fungo rosso 
Mancato funzionamento 
del dispositivo di 
protezione 
Guasto del dispositivo di 
comando 
OR 
Mancato ripristino 
manuale delle condizioni 
di sicurezza a seguito di 
precedente intervento del 
dispositivo 
Mancata interruzione del 
ciclo di lavorazione 
3 3 5 4 44 
6.4 Pulsante di emergenza posto 
sul quadro elettrico 
Mancato funzionamento 
del dispositivo di 
protezione 
Guasto elettrico, mancata 
apertura dei contatti 
Mancata interruzione del 
ciclo di lavorazione 3 1 2 2 12 
6.5 Piano mobile munito di 
micro di sicurezza elettrico 
che ferma il movimento 
quando si raggiunge la quota 
minima di mm.200 
Mancato arresto del piano 
mobile in fase di discesa 
Guasto del micro di 
sicurezza 
Potenziale situazione di 
pericolo in caso di 
presenza dell’operatore 
Il pezzo in lavorazione 
viene rovinato 
3 1 1 4 20 
6.6 Pressostati Aumento di pressione nei 
circuiti idraulici della 
pressa 
Malfunzionamento 
pressostato per mancata 
chiusura dei contatti 
Collasso delle tubazioni 
Proiezione di fluido 
caldo e pericolo di 
scottature 
Incendio 
4 3 5 2 24 
6.7 Valvole di sicurezza  
Valvole di sovrappressione  
Aumento della pressione 
nei circuiti idraulici della 
pressa 
Mancato intervento delle 
valvole di sicurezza 
Collasso delle tubazioni 
Proiezione di fluido 
caldo e pericolo di 
scottature 
Incendio 
2 3 4 2 18 
6.8 Funzioni di sicurezza del 
sistema di controllo: 
- Funzione di arresto legata 
alla sicurezza avviata da 
un mezzo di protezione 
- funzione di ripristino 
manuale 
- funzione di riavviamento 
- funzione di inibizione 
- funzione di azione 
mantenuta 
- prevenzione 
dell’avviamento inatteso 
- modalità di comando e 
selezione di modalità 
- interazione tra le diverse 
parti dei sistemi di 
comando legate alla 
sicurezza 
- funzione di arresto di 
emergenza 
 
Mancata messa in 
sicurezza della macchina 
Avaria del sistema di 
controllo 
Ferita, schiacciamento, 
cesoiamento, 
amputazione dita e mani 
2 3 4 3 27 
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7. Manutenzione         
7.1  Pulizia della pressa         
7.1.1 Accesso all’area di pericolo 
della pressa 
La macchina riparte senza 
autorizzazione 
Guasto elettrico al sistema 
di comando  
OR  
Guasto del software 
OR 
Influenza esterna sul 
sistema elettrico (campo 
elettromagnetico indotto) 
Frattura agli arti 
Cesoiamento 
3 1 3 3 21 
7.1.2 Inserimento blocco 
meccanico di sicurezza della 
slitta della pressa 
Mancato inserimento del 
blocco meccanico di 
sicurezza della slitta della 
pressa 
Errore dell’operatore 
OR 
Caduta per gravità della 
trave che trattiene il 
punzone per un guasto del 
sistema idraulico, per un 
guasto meccanico o per un 
guasto del sistema di 
controllo elettrico 
Accesso pericoloso alla 
macchina 
3 1 3 3 21 
7.1.3 Inserimento della sicurezza 
meccanica con selettore a 
chiave 
Mancato inserimento della 
sicurezza 
Guasto del selettore 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore 
Accesso pericoloso alla 
macchina 3 1 3 3 21 
7.1.4 Apertura dell’interruttore 
generale di alimentazione 
elettrica della pressa 
Mancata interruzione 
dell’alimentazione elettrica 
Guasto elettrico 
OR 
Dimenticanza 
dell’operatore 
Contatto diretto e 
folgorazione 
2 1 3 4 24 
7.1.5 Chiusura delle saracinesche  Saracinesche bloccate 
aperte 
Perdita d’olio pericolosa 
OR 
Svuotamento del serbatoio 
Formazione di chiazze 
d’olio sul pavimento e 
rischio scivolamento 
 
3 1 3 2 14 
7.2 Controllo funzione delle spie 
luminose di sicurezza 
Mancato controllo delle 
spie luminose 
Errore operativo Mancato intervento del 
dispositivo di protezione 
su chiamata e situazione 
di pericolo per 
l’operatore 
2 1 5 2 16 
7.3 Pulizia del fluido idraulico Fuoriuscita di fluido   Fluido in pressione Schizzi d’olio, ustione 2 1 3 2 12 
7.4 Controllo mensile del 
serraggio delle viti 
Mancato serraggio delle 
viti 
Errore operativo Funzionamento fuori 
specifica della macchina 
Fermi macchina 
indesiderati 
3 1 3 1 7 
7.5 Pulizia annuale del serbatoio Mancata pulizia del 
serbatoio 
Errore operativo Funzionamento 
degradato della 
macchina 
Fermi macchina 
indesiderati 
2 1 2 1 5 
7.5.1 Sostituzione della cartuccia 
filtri 
Mancata sostituzione della 
cartuccia filtri 
Errore operativo Intasamento circuiti e 
degrado della macchina 
Fermi macchina 
indesiderati 
2 1 3 1 6 
73 
 
N° Fasi 
Pericolo 
Deviazione 
Cause Conseguenze 
F 
D R 
Pr Av Fr 
7.6 Controllo giornaliero dei 
pulsanti di emergenza 
Mancato controllo dei 
pulsanti di emergenza 
Errore operativo 
OR 
Errata procedura 
Mancato intervento del 
dispositivo di protezione 
su chiamata. 
2 1 5 1 8 
7.7 Controllo giornaliero delle 
barre di sicurezza 
Mancato controllo delle 
barre di sicurezza 
OR  
Il dispositivo non viene 
ripristinato correttamente 
dopo il controllo 
Errore operativo 
 
 
Errore operativo 
Accesso pericoloso alla 
macchina 
2 1 5 1 8 
7.8 Controllo sistema idraulico         
7.8.1 Controllo settimanale dei 
giunti per tubi 
Fuoriuscita di fluido ad alta 
pressione 
Rottura casuale della 
tubazione 
OR 
Cadute di pressione 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore 
Schizzi di fluido sul 
manutentore e irritazione 
cutanea 
 
2 1 4 2 14 
7.8.2 Controllo settimanale flange Perdita dalle flange 
Fuoriuscita di fluido ad alta 
pressione 
Rottura casuale della 
tubazione 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore nel 
serraggio delle viti 
Schizzi di fluido sul 
manutentore e irritazione 
cutanea 
 
2 1 4 2 14 
7.8.2
.1 
Cambio guarnizioni Fuoriuscita olio idraulico Mancata chiusura delle 
saracinesche 
Formazione di chiazze 
d’olio sul pavimento e 
rischio scivolamento 
 
3 1 2 1 6 
7.8.3 Controllo mensile tubi 
flessibili di pressione 
   
     
7.8.3
.1 
Verifica tubi flessibili di 
pressione 
Fuoriuscita di fluido ad alta 
pressione 
Rottura casuale della 
tubazione 
OR 
Caduta di pressione 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore per 
mancata chiusura delle 
saracinesche 
Schizzi di fluido sul 
manutentore e irritazione 
cutanea 
2 1 3 2 12 
7.8.4 Controllo mensile tubi 
flessibili di scarico 
Fuoriuscita di fluido ad alta 
pressione 
Rottura casuale della 
tubazione 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore per 
mancata chiusura delle 
saracinesche 
Schizzi di fluido sul 
manutentore e irritazione 
cutanea 
2 1 3 2 12 
7.8.5 Controllo mensile della 
taratura delle valvole di 
massima pressione  
Mancata taratura delle 
valvole 
Errore operativo Pericoloso aumento di 
pressione nel circuito 
oleodinamico  
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 
 
2 1 3 1 6 
7.8.6 Controllo mensile della 
taratura delle valvole di 
Mancato controllo 
periodico delle valvole di 
Errore operativo Malfunzionamento 
valvole con pericoloso 
2 1 3 1 6 
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sicurezza sicurezza aumento di pressione nel 
circuito oleodinamico  
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 
 
7.8.7 Controllo mensile pressostati Perdite di olio pericolose Mancata chiusura delle 
saracinesche 
Formazione di chiazze 
d’olio sul pavimento e 
rischio scivolamento 
Svuotamento del 
serbatoio 
3 1 3 1 7 
7.9 Controllo annuale del sistema 
elettrico 
   
     
7.9.1 Lavori su sistema elettrico Contatto diretto con 
elementi sotto tensione 
Mancanza di protezioni 
contro i contatti diretti 
OR  
Mancata apertura 
interruttore generale di 
alimentazione elettrica 
della pressa. 
Folgorazione 
3 1 2 4 24 
7.9.2 Lavori su sistema elettrico Contatto indiretto Mancanza di protezioni 
contro i contatti indiretti 
OR 
Guasto messa a terra 
 
Folgorazione 
2 1 2 4 20 
7.10 Lubrificazione settimanale Mancata lubrificazione Errore operativo Intasamento circuiti 
idraulici 
Perdita di rendimento 
della macchina 
2 1 4 1 7 
7.11 Riparazione         
7.11.
1 
Operazione di cambio 
punzone 
Avviamento intempestivo 
della macchina 
 
Cortocircuito 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore 
Traumi dovuti a 
schiacciamento 3 1 1 3 15 
Caduta punzone Errore dell’operatore Traumi dovuti a 
schiacciamento 2 1 1 3 12 
7.11.
2 
Operazione di cambio della 
matrice 
Avviamento intempestivo 
della macchina 
Cortocircuito 
OR 
Errore dell’operatore 
Traumi dovuti a 
schiacciamento 3 1 1 3 15 
7.11. 
3 
Riposizionamento della zona 
protetta 
Mancato riposizionamento 
della protezione 
Errore/dimenticanza 
dell’operatore 
Traumi dovuti a 
schiacciamento 4 1 1 3 18 
7.11.
4 
Sostituzione guarnizioni 
cilindro imbutitura 
Mancata sostituzione 
 
Utilizzo di una guarnizione 
non idonea 
Errore operativo 
 
Errore operativo 
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 
Fermo macchina 
indesiderato 
3 1 2 1 6 
7.11.
5 
Sostituzione guarnizioni 
valvola di riempimento DN 
120 
Mancata sostituzione 
 
Utilizzo di una guarnizione 
non idonea 
Errore operativo 
 
Errore operativo 
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 
Fermo macchina 
indesiderato 
3 1 2 1 6 
7.11.
6 
Sostituzione guarnizioni 
cilindro premilamiera 
Mancata sostituzione 
 
Errore operativo 
 
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 3 1 2 1 6 
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Utilizzo di una guarnizione 
non idonea 
Errore operativo Fermo macchina 
indesiderato 
7.11.
7 
Sostituzione guarnizioni 
sicurezza meccanica 
Mancata sostituzione 
 
Utilizzo di una guarnizione 
non idonea 
Errore operativo 
 
Errore operativo 
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 
Fermo macchina 
indesiderato 
3 1 2 1 6 
7.11.
8 
Sostituzione guarnizioni 
estrattore pneumatico 
Mancata sostituzione 
 
Utilizzo di una guarnizione 
non idonea 
Errore operativo 
 
Errore operativo 
Perdita di efficienza 
della macchina 
Fermo macchina 
indesiderato 
3 1 2 1 6 
8. Messa fuori servizio         
8.1 Scollegamento macchina da 
rete elettrica 
Mancato scollegamento 
macchina da rete elettrica 
Errore operativo Avviamento 
intempestivo della 
macchina 
2 1 1 1 4 
8.2 Indicazione  con opportuna 
segnaletica di messa fuori 
servizio della macchina 
Mancata segnalazione Errore operativo Potenziale utilizzo 
pericoloso della 
macchina 
3 1 1 1 5 
8.3 Smantellamento         
8.3.1 Smontaggio macchina Caduta pezzi Errore operativo Schiacciamento 2 1 1 2 8 
8.3.2 Sollevamento Caduta pezzi dall’alto Errore operativo Schiacciamento 3 1 1 2 10 
8.3.3 Imballaggio         
8.4 Smaltimento differenziato         
8.4.1 Recupero oli Mancato recupero olio 
idraulico 
Errore operativo Perdita di olio e 
sversamento con 
creazione di pozze d’olio 
sul pavimento 
Esposizione al rischio 
chimico dell’operatore 
2 1 1 2 8 
8.4.2 Recupero parti metalliche Mancato recupero parti 
metalliche 
Errore operativo Mancata applicazione 
della raccolta 
differenziata 
2 1 1 1 4 
8.4.3 Recupero RAEE Mancato recupero rifiuti 
apparecchiature elettriche 
ed elettroniche 
Errore operativo Mancata applicazione 
della raccolta 
differenziata 
2 1 1 1 4 
8.4.4 Recupero materiale plastico Mancato recupero e 
stoccaggio di materiale 
plastico 
Errore operativo Mancata applicazione 
della raccolta 
differenziata 
2 1 1 1 4 
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12.2  ANNEX: APPENDIX OF HAZID ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N° Phases 
Hazard 
Deviation 
Cause Consequences 
(Cl) 
 (Se) R 
Pr Av Fr 
2. Installation    
     
2.1 Connection    
     
2.1.1 Cable connection of 
switch  
Direct contact 
OR 
Indirect contact with 
elements that come 
voltage under fault 
conditions. 
 
Contact with the 
ground voltage 
Electrocution 3 1 1 4 20 
4. Processing cycle         
4.1 Setting tools         
4.1.1 
Positioning the die 
suitable to the type 
of work involved 
Contact with tool  
Accidental start of 
the machine 
Hurt, crushing, cutting, 
upper limb amputation 
3 3 4 4 40 
Gravity fall of the 
slide/ram because of  
a failure of hydraulic 
system, fault of 
hydraulic system  
Hurt, crushing, cutting, 
upper limb amputation 3 1 4 4 32 
4.2.  
Feeding and 
loading raw 
materials 
        
4.2.1 Feeding of metal 
sheet (by hand) 
Contact with tool 
Accidental start of the 
machine  because of  
wrong position of the 
safety contact. 
Hurt, crushing, cutting, 
upper limb amputation 3 3 5 4 44 
4.3 Material 
processing 
        
… 
… 
… … … … … … … … 
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12.3  ANNEX: TABLE USED FOR THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE GIS 
id Man-Machine function Failure mode Causes Consequences L C R 
2 Commissioning 
            
2.1 Check the conformity of the wiring 
with the diagrams 
            
2.1.
1 
Commissioner checks wiring and 
equipment functional checks 
Commissioner makes an 
error in  choosing the 
wrong circuit /cable 
Awkward 
reachability of 
wiring in the 
back, ladder 
needed, wrong 
labelling 
 Short-
circuit/Secondary 
equipment damage 
C II 2 
Commissioner  falls from 
the ladder 
Awkward 
reachability of 
wiring in the 
back, ladder 
needed  
Injury 
Commissioner gets caught 
with his fingers  
Door does not 
remain open 
(fingers trapped) 
Injury 
  Handle designed 
to open front 
panel causes 
risk of trapping 
fingers. 
  
2.2 Operator check heater and 
thermostats are working (to keep 
humidity low within cabinet) 
Commissioner  falls from 
the ladder 
Working at 
height (on 
ladder) 
Injury 
B II 1 
Commissioner can not see 
the thermostat indicator 
Awkward 
reachability 
Moisture ingress  
    Deterioration of 
internal contacts 
Heater fault Heater is broken Moisture ingress  
  
  Deterioration of 
internal contacts 
Check omitted Awkward 
reachability 
Moisture ingress  
    Deterioration of 
internal relay 
contacts 
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2.3 Check interlocks are properly 
working 
            
2.3.
1 
Visual and physical check if the 
manual opening and closing of the 
earth switch is inhibited when the 
circuit breaker is in a closed position. 
Check ommitted Operator cannot 
see the position 
of the circuit 
breaker in the 
middle bays. 
Failure of 
interlocking allowing 
the earth swithch to 
be closed on to a live  
busbar.Short-circuit 
to earth.Falls from 
height. 
C II 2 
                
                
2.4 Commissioning of  HV cables 
(checking of phasing and checking 
of cables integrity) 
Operator misinterprets the 
correct position of cables 
Tagging not 
clear or not 
readable, 
tagging of bays 
not readable 
from bottom 
positions where 
cables are 
Incorrect 
phasing.Cable fault 
to earth 
C II 2 
Commissioner  is bent in 
awkward position and 
increases likelyhood of 
making a mistake 
Cables are in 
very awkward 
positon in the 
bays that are not  
on the outside, 
difficult to reach 
and difficult to 
keep working in 
that positions 
(how long do 
they need for 
each bay to 
connect cable in 
that position?) 
Musculoskeletal 
Injuries 
2.4.
1 
Commissioning of the CT circuits. Commissioner 
misinterprets the identity of 
CT cores and secondary 
cable locations. Position 
increases the likelyhood of 
making a mistake. 
CT cores are in 
very awkward 
positon in the 
bays that are not  
on the outside, 
difficult to reach 
and difficult to 
keep working in 
that positions 
(how long do 
they need for 
each bay to test 
the cables?) 
Testing of incorrect 
bay.Testing of 
incorrect CT 
core.Musculoskeletal 
injuries 
C III 2 
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2.5 Fill  SF6 gas in bays Refill not properly 
performed 
Difficult to reach 
certain refill 
valves in bays 
not on the 
outside 
(feasbility of 
building a 
passegeway 
between circuit 
breaker and 
earth switch 
section currently 
there are cables 
that could be 
position 
underneath the 
passegeway) 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock 
out.Falls from a 
height.Musculosketal 
Injuries. 
B II 1 
    Refil omitted Difficult to reach 
certain refill 
valves in bays 
not on the 
outside 
(feasbility of 
building a 
passegeway 
between circuit 
breaker and 
earth switch 
section currently 
there are cables 
that could be 
position 
underneath the 
passegeway) 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock 
out.Falls from a 
height.Musculosketal 
Injuries. 
2.6 Measurement of gas quality 
            
2.6.
1 
Check gas at right pressure Visual check failed Manometers are 
not readable 
(facing the 
wrong side (see 
picture) and in 
positions not 
easy to reach or 
see. 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock 
out.Musculoskeletal 
Injuries. 
B II 1 
Misinterpret the gas 
pressure (can not see 
gauge) 
Manometers are 
not readable 
(facing the 
wrong side (see 
picture) and in 
positions not 
easy to reach or 
see. 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock 
out.Musculoskeletal 
Injuries. 
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Commissioner falls from 
height 
Manometers are 
in positions not 
easy to reach or 
see and operator 
is forced to use a 
ladder. 
Injuries 
Manometers fault Manometer is 
broken 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock out. 
2.6.
2 
Check dew point for moisture 
content.Check % SF6. 
Misinterpret the dew point 
and moisture content 
(commission) 
Inaccessible gas 
testing points 
SF6 gas 
Integrity.Insulation 
breakdown.Musculos
ketal Injuries. 
B II 1 
Commissioner falls from 
height 
Inaccessible gas 
testing points 
Injuries 
2.6.
3 
Check for gas leaks Gas leak Incorrect 
mounting of 
flange/pressure 
release valve 
failure 
Release of toxic 
substance.Release 
of greenhouse gas. 
C II 2 
    Insulation integrity 
unknown (omission) 
Inaccessible gas 
testing points 
Insulation 
breakdown.Musculos
ketal Injuries. 
2.7 Inspection of Circuit Breaker  
(N.1and 2 in the figure) 
            
2.7.
1 
Check circuit breaker operation Circuit breaker fails to 
open on 'open' 
command.Circuit breaker 
fails to close on 'close 
command. 
Incorrect control 
wiring.Incorrect 
local operation. 
Incorrect operation. D III 3 
2.7.
2 
Check circuit breaker timing Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
Awkward 
reachability  
Protection may 
operate incorrectly. 
C III 2 
2.7.
3 
Check circuit breaker position 
indication 
Circuit breaker in wrong 
position 
Cannot view 
position 
indication  
Interlocking  should 
prevent Operator 
attempting to 
operate a disconnect 
on load. 
D III 3 
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2.7.
4 
Check circuit breaker contact 
resistance 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
Awkward 
reachability  
Awkward 
reachability.Effect on 
circuit breaker 
performance. 
B III 2 
Falls from height   Injury 
2.8 Test Voltage Transformer (N.6 in 
the figure) 
        
2.8.
1 
Check if the equipment is adequately 
earthed 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth 
B III 2 Commissioner wrong to 
detect the position of 
indicator 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth 
2.8.
2 
Check if supporting metal-work is 
earthed 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
Difficult tocheck 
the earthing 
arrangement for 
the internal bays. 
If frame is not 
earthed the frame 
could be come live in 
case of fault (risk of 
being elelctrocuted) 
B I 1 
2.8.
3 
Check if the main earth strap on the 
secondary side is easily accessible 
without causing interference to the VT 
secondary winding 
Omission (commissioner 
does not  carry out visual 
check or electrical test) 
Awkward 
reachability / 
access. 
VT not 
earthed.Electrical 
test not carried out. 
C II
I 
2 
2.8.
4 
Perform Omicron Ratio Test  Omisison to check VT ratio VT secondary 
cores are in a 
very awkward 
positon situated 
on top of the 
bay.Difficult to 
reach and 
difficult to keep 
working in that 
positions for a 
long duration. 
Possible faulty 
condition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay (might not 
trip in event of fault) 
C II
I 
2 
2.8.
5 
Check insulation resistance between 
windings (Primary to secondary) 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth C II 2 
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2.8.
6 
Check insulation resistance between 
windings and earth 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth C II 2 
2.8.
7 
Check insulation resistance of 
secondary circuits to earth 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth C II 2 
2.8.
8 
Check if the continuity of windings is 
correct 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth C II 2 
2.8.
9 
Check if the Primary Winding earth is 
adequately protected 
Inaccessible to carry out 
visual check 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Broken earth.Open 
circuit. 
C II
I 
2 
2.8.
10 
Check if the secondary wiring is used 
appriopriate to the application 
Inaccessible nameplate to 
gather 
information/inaccessible to 
test 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
C II 2 
2.8.
11 
Check earthing on secondary 
terminals 
Inaccessible to check Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
C II 2 
2.8.
12 
Check if phasing is correct to 
terminals and relays 
Crossing of phases Problems with 
labelling 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
C II 2 
2.8.
13 
Check if the ratio of the VT is correct Omisison to check VT ratio VT secondary 
cores are in a 
very awkward 
positon situated 
on top of the 
bay.Difficult to 
reach and 
difficult to keep 
working in that 
positions for a 
long duration. 
Possible faulty 
codnition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay (might not 
trip in event of fault) 
C II 2 
2.8.
14 
Check VT  winding application for 
metering and protection  
Inaccessible to check Awkward 
reachability / 
access. 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
C II 2 
2.8.
15 
Verify if VT secondary wiring 
connections have been checked for 
tightness 
Loose connection Connections 
removed during 
tests 
Arcing of 
contacts.Electrocutio
n.Equipment does 
not operate 
 B II 2 
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      No adequate 
training 
        
2.8.
16 
Record VT data and test results  Commissioner does not 
record the test results  
Asset data is 
inaccessible in 
the internal bays 
Insufficient asset 
data and test results 
for the equipment. 
C II
I 
2 
                
2.9 Test Current Trasformer (N.5 in the 
figure) 
            
2.9.
1 
Check if supporting metal-work is 
earthed 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
Difficult to check 
the earthing 
arangement on 
internal bays 
bays. 
If frame is not 
earthed the frame 
could be come live in 
case of fault (risk of 
being elelctrocuted) 
B I 1 
2.9.
2 
Check if the equipment is earthed 
correctly 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check CT 
secondary circuits.) 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
If frame is not 
earthed the frame 
could become live in 
case of fault (risk of 
being elelctrocuted) 
B II
I 
2 
2.9.
3 
Check if the equipment is firmly bolted 
down 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
Difficult to 
access holding 
dowm bolts on 
internal bays 
Vibrations could 
displace equipment. 
C II
I 
2 
2.9.
4 
Test insulation resistance  Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Possible  internal 
fault  in CT could go 
undetected resulting 
in undetected.Result 
in HV fault / fire. 
C II 2 
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2.9.
5 
Perform Omicron Tan Delta Test  Omisison to check 
condition of insulation 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Possible undetected 
faulty insulation 
condition may result 
in insulation 
breakdown 
C II 2 
2.9.
6 
Perform Omicron Ratio Test Results  Omisison to check CT 
ratio 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Posisble faulty 
condition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay (might not 
trip in event of fault) 
C II 2 
2.9.
7 
Perform CT Analsyer Test Omisison to check CT 
ratio 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Posisble faulty 
codnition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay (might not 
trip in event of fault) 
C II 2 
2.9.
8 
Check if a magnetising curve have 
been conducted on each winding (to 
check if the correct secondary winding 
has been connected) 
Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Secondary windings 
to be used for 
measuring could be 
worngly used for 
protection purposes  
C II 2 
2.9.
9 
Perform a CT Burden Measurement Secondary current for CT 
exceeded 
Selection of 
incorrect 
secondary 
winding due to 
location 
Protection may 
operate incorrectly 
D II 2 
2.9.
10 
Check  polarity of CT Omission (commissioner 
does not check) 
CT inacessible 
to check polarity 
in middle bays 
Protection may 
operate 
incorrectly.Polarity of 
CT incorrect. 
C II 2 
2.9.
11 
Check if unused secondaries are 
shorted and earthed (Specify which 
windings & location) 
Open circuited CT 
secondary 
winding.Induced voltage at 
CT inacessible 
to check if 
unused 
secondary cores 
Electrocution/Burns D I 2 
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secondary terminals. are short 
circuited. 
2.9.
12 
Check if the HV connections are 
tightened to the correct torque setting. 
Loose connection. HV connections 
inaccessible to 
check torque 
Arcing / short-circuit C II 2 
2.9.
13 
Record CT data and test results  Commissioner does not 
record the test results  
Asset data is 
inaccessible in 
the internal bays 
Insufficient asset 
data and test results 
for the equipment. 
C II
I 
2 
                
3 
Closure circuit in Normal operation 
Fail close circuit Main contact 
damage 
  C II
I 
2 
  
  
  Contact 
corrosion 
  C II
I 
2 
  
  
  Contact erosion   C II
I 
2 
  
  
  Spring 
mechanism 
broken"closing 
spring unwound" 
  C II
I 
2 
    
            
4 
Opening circuit in normal operation 
Fail open circuit Main contact 
damage 
    
  
  
  
  
  Contact welding 
together 
        
  
  
  Spring 
mechanism 
broken"closing 
spring wound" 
        
                
4.1 Arc extinction Release of substance from 
the decomposition gas 
Leak of 
enclosure 
Exposure to 
dangerous 
substances 
      
  
  
            
  
  
            
  
  
Failure of insulation under 
electric stress 
Disruptive 
discharge 
Electric shock of the 
operator 
      
                
                
86 
 
id Man-Machine function Failure mode Causes Consequences L C R 
5 Emeregency Opening 
            
5.1 Interrupt fault during fault 
condition 
            
5.1.
1 
Operator manually opening the 
breaker in case of fault 
Operator fails to resolve 
situation in time 
Very difficult to 
reach the 
manual gear to 
open the switch 
in case of fault 
manually 
especially for the 
bays in middle 
positions. 
  B II 1 
                
6 Visual inspections 
            
6.1 Take counter reading if cycles 
above 10.000 perform minor 
maintenance 
Operating cycle counter 
does not work 
Operating 
linkage is loose 
or defective          
operating cycle 
counter is 
defective 
Incorrect 
maintenance 
B III 2 
Operator can not see the 
counter 
Awkward 
reachability 
Incorrect 
maintenance 
6.2 Circuit breaker and motor wound 
mechanism 
            
6.2.
1 
Inspect cabinet(free of damages), 
check heater functions, verify 
ventilation opening allow free air 
movement, examine view windows 
must be clear of dust and moisture 
Operator fail to make the 
checks 
The window to 
be checked and 
the ventilation 
opening are not 
easily 
reacheable 
Presence of moisture 
in the breaker can go 
undetected 
B II 1 
  
              
6.3 Earth Switch -Check position 
indication and verify that is it the 
same as the remote position 
Operator fails to detect 
position indication is 
incorrect 
Distraction Earth switch may not 
function correclty.No 
earths applied for 
maintenace.  
B II 1 
  
  
    Lack of earthing 
during maintenance 
                
6.4 Insulations gas and density 
supervision 
            
6.4.
1 
Check gas at right pressure? Visual check failed Manometers are 
not readable 
(facing the 
wrong side (see 
picture) and in 
positions not 
easy to reach or 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock out. 
B II 1 
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see. 
Misinterpret the gas 
pressure (can not see 
gauge) 
Manometers are 
not readable 
(facing the 
wrong side (see 
picture) and in 
positions not 
easy to reach or 
see. 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock out. 
Manometers fault Manometer is 
broken 
Low gas 
pressure.Circuit 
breaker lock out. 
                
6.4.
2 
Refilling of Gas Incomplete operation Inaccessible gas 
testing points, 
and manometers 
not visible 
Arc might not be 
exstinguished as it 
should, human 
operator falls form 
hight 
B II 1 
Refill omitted Inaccessible gas 
testing points, 
and manometers 
not visible 
Arc might not be 
exstinguished as it 
should, human 
operator falls form 
hight 
6.4.
3 
Check dew point for moisture content Misinterpret the dew point 
and moisture content 
(commission) 
Inaccessible gas 
testing points 
Insulation 
breakdown 
B II 1 
Operator fall from height Inaccessible gas 
testing points. 
Injuries 
                
6.4.
4 
Check for gas leaks Gas leak Incorrect 
mounting of 
flange/pressure 
release valve 
failure 
Release of toxic 
substance 
C II 2 
Insulation integrity 
unknown (omission) 
Inaccessible gas 
testing points. 
Insulation 
breakdown. 
Musculoskeletal 
injuries 
7 Minor inspections intervention             
7.1 Disconnect from high voltage 
network 
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7.1.
1 
Disconnection of Equipment Error in identifying correct 
bay for 
disconnection.Labelling 
Discrepency in 
the layout of 
equipement and 
standard layout 
Hazard of 
electrocution 
B I 1 
The apparatus is 
connected to other source 
of supply 
Operator mis- 
reads the status 
of the apparatus 
Hazard of 
electrocution 
                
7.1.
2 
Apply  Hold Off (HO )notes to the 
point of disconnection 
Operator ommission Operator omitted 
to apply HO to 
apparatus due to 
awkward 
position 
Hazard of 
electrocution.Falls 
from height. 
B I 1 
                
7.2 Earth switchgear on both sides 
with the earthing switches 
provided 
            
7.2.
1 
Proof of application of main earth Error in identifying correct 
bay to apply main 
earth.Labelling 
Discrepency in 
the layout of 
equipement and 
standard layout 
Hazard of 
electrocution 
B I 1 
                
7.3 Minor Inspection Circuit Breaker in 
service 
  
      
7.3.
1 
Take counter reading if cycles above 
10.000 perform minor maintenance 
Operating cycle counter 
does not work 
Operating 
linkage is loose 
or defective, 
operating cycle 
counter is 
defective 
Incorrect 
maintenance 
B III 2 
    Operator can not see the 
counter 
Awkward 
reachability 
Incorrect 
maintenance 
7.3.
2 
Check circuit breaker operation Circuit breaker spurios 
opening/reclosing 
Circuitr breaker 
control circuit 
fault 
Incorrect operation C II
I 
2 
7.3.
3 
Check circuit breaker timing Omission (operator does 
not check) 
Awkward 
reachability  
Protection delay or 
not correct protection 
B II
I 
2 
7.3.
4 
Check circuit breaker position 
indication 
Circuit breaker in wrong 
position 
Cannot view 
position 
indication  
Operation of 
disconnect on load  
B II
I 
2 
7.3.
5 
Check circuit breaker contact 
resistance 
Omission (operator does 
not check) 
Awkward 
reachability  
Falls from height. 
Awkward reachability 
B II
I 
2 
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7.3.
6 
Check of motor-wound spring 
operating mechanisms 
Circuit breaker mechanism 
fails to operate. 
Mechanical fault 
in the 
mechanism 
causing spring 
failure or 
mechanism 
failure. 
Impact injuries.Eye 
injuries from flying 
parts of the 
mechanism. 
C II 2 
    
            
7.4 Minor Inspection Voltage 
Transformer  
            
7.4.
1 
Check if the equipment is adequately 
earthed 
Omission (operator does 
not check) 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to 
earth.Earth fault. 
B III 2 Commission operator 
wrong to detect the 
position of indicator 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth 
7.4.
2 
Check if supporting metal-work is 
earthed 
Omission (operator does 
not check) 
Difficult tocheck 
the earthing 
arrangement for 
the internal bays. 
If frame is not 
earthed the frame 
could be come live in 
case of fault (risk of 
being elelctrocuted) 
B I 1 
7.4.
3 
Check if the main earth strap on the 
secondary side is easily accessible 
without causing interference to the VT 
secondary winding 
Omission (operator does 
not  carry out visual check) 
Awkward 
reachability / 
access. 
VT not earthed. 
Electrical test not 
carried out 
B II
I 
2 
7.4.
4 
Perform Omicron Ratio Test  Omisison to check CT 
ratio 
VT secondary 
cores are in a 
very awkward 
positon situated 
on top of the 
bay.Difficult to 
reach and 
difficult to keep 
working in that 
positions for a 
long duration. 
Posisble faulty 
codnition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay 9might not 
trip in event of fault) 
B II
I 
2 
7.4.
5 
Check Insulation resistance between 
windings (Primary to secondary) 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth B II 1 
7.4.
6 
Check insulation resistance between 
windings and earth 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth B II 1 
7.4.
7 
Check Insulation resistance of 
secondary circuits to earth 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth B II 1 
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7.4.
8 
Check if the continuity of windings is 
correct 
Inaccessible to test Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Short circuit to earth B II 1 
7.4.
9 
Check if the Primary Winding earth is 
adequately protected 
Inaccessible to carry out 
visual check 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Broken earth.Open 
circuit. 
B II
I 
1 
7.4.
10 
Check if the secondary wiring is used 
appriopriate to the application 
Inaccessible nameplate to 
gather 
information/inaccessible to 
test 
Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
B II 1 
7.4.
11 
Check earthing on secondary 
terminals 
Inaccessible to check Unsafe location 
/awkward 
position 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
B II 1 
7.4.
12 
Check if phasing is correct to 
terminals and relays 
Crossing of Phases Problems with 
labelling 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
B II 1 
7.4.
13 
Check if the ratio of the VT is correct Omisison to check VT ratio VT secondary 
cores are in a 
very awkward 
positon situated 
on top of the 
bay.Difficult to 
reach and 
difficult to keep 
working in that 
positions for a 
long duration. 
Posisble faulty 
codnition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay (might not 
trip in event of fault) 
B II 1 
7.4.
14 
Check VT winding application for 
metering and protection  
Inaccessible to check Awkward 
reachability / 
access. 
Protection & 
metering windings 
get mixed 
up.Incorrect 
operation of 
protection. 
B II 1 
7.4.
15 
Verify if VT secondary wiring 
connections have been checked for 
tightness 
Loose connection Connections 
removed during 
tests. 
Arcing of 
contacts.Electrocutio
n.Equipment does 
not operate. 
B II 1 
7.4.
16 
Record VT data and test results  Commissioner does not 
record the test results  
Asset data is 
inaccessible in 
the internal bays 
Insufficient asset 
data and test results 
for the equipment. 
B II
I 
2 
                
7.5 Minor Inspection Current 
Trasformer  
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7.5.
1 
Check if supporting metal-work is 
earthed 
Omission (operator does 
not check) 
Difficult to check 
the earthing 
arangement on 
internal bays 
bays. 
If frame is not 
earthed the frame 
could be come live in 
case of fault (risk of 
being elelctrocuted) 
B I 1 
7.5.
2 
Check if the equipment is earthed 
correctly 
Omission (operator does 
not check CT secondary 
circuit) 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
If frame is not 
earthed the frame 
could be come live in 
case of fault (risk of 
being elelctrocuted) 
B II
I 
2 
7.5.
3 
Check if the equipment is firmly bolted 
down 
Omission (operator does 
not check) 
Difficult to 
access holding 
dowm bolts on 
internal bays 
Vibrations could 
displace equipment 
B II
I 
2 
7.5.
4 
Test insulation resistance  Omission (operator does 
not check) 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Possible  internal 
fault  in CT could go 
undetected resulting 
in undetected.Result 
in HV fault / fire. 
B II 1 
7.5.
5 
Perform Omicron Tan Delta Test 
(ratio to resistive current to capacitive 
current) 
Omisison to check 
condition of insulation 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Possible undetected 
faulty insulation 
condition may result 
in insulation 
breakdown 
B II 1 
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7.5.
6 
Perform Omicron Ratio Test Results  Omisison to check CT 
ratio 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Posisble faulty 
codnition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay 9might not 
trip in event of fault) 
B II 1 
7.5.
7 
Perform CT Analsyer Test Omisison to check CT 
ratio 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
positon. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Posisble faulty 
codnition may result 
in malfunctioning of 
the Relay 9might not 
trip in event of fault) 
B II 1 
7.5.
8 
Check if a magnetising curve have 
been conducted on each winding (to 
check if the correct secondary winding 
has been connected) 
Omission (operator does 
not check) 
CT secondary 
cores are 
situated are in 
very awkward 
position. .Difficult 
to reach and 
difficult to work 
in this position 
for a long 
duration of time. 
Secondary windings 
to be used for 
measuring could be 
worngly used fro 
protection pupuses  
B II 1 
7.5.
9 
Perform a CT Burden Measurement Secondary current for CT 
exceeded 
Selection of 
incorrect 
secondary 
winding due to 
location 
Protection may 
operate incorrectly 
C II 2 
7.5.
10 
Check  polarity of CT Omission (operator does 
not check) 
CT inacessible 
to check polarity 
in middle bays 
Protection may 
operate 
incorrectly.Polarity of 
CT incorrect. 
B II 1 
7.5.
11 
Check if unused secondaries are 
shorted and earthed (Specify which 
windings & location) 
Open circuited CT 
secondary winding. 
Induced voltage at 
secondary terminals. 
CT inaccessible 
to check if 
unused 
secondary cores 
are short 
circuited. 
Electrocution/Burns C I 1 
7.5.
12 
Check if the HV connections are 
tightened to the correct torque setting. 
Loose connection. HV connections 
inaccessible to 
check torque 
Arcing / short-circuit B II 1 
7.5.
13 
Record CT data and test results  Commissioner does not 
record the test results  
Asset data is 
inaccessible in 
the internal bays 
Insufficient asset 
data and test results 
for the equipment. 
B II
I 
2 
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12.4  ANNEX: TABLE USED FOR TASK ANALYSIS OF USE OF A PRESS 
ID Man-Machine function Link to Failure mode Causes Consequences 
  
          
1 Work on the press (only one operator) 
  -     
1.1 Setting of the equipment 1.1.2 Operation by two instead of 
one person 
Wrong operation mode Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
1.1.2 Check area is clear of tools   If clear 
1.1.4, if 
not clear  
1.1.3 
Omission (operator doesn't 
check), some operator left 
some tool in dangerous zone 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure, lack of concern 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
1.1.3 Remove every tools from dangerous area 1.1.4 Omission (operator doesn't 
remove tools) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure, lack of concern 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
1.1.4 Put press on intermittently command 1.1.5 Operator presses incorrect 
button 
Error of the operator Hurt, crushing, 
cutting, upper limb 
amputation 
Accidental start of the machine Wrong wiring of cables, 
switch shorted out, 
controls improperly 
installed 
Contact with tools, 
hurt, crushing, 
cutting, upper limb 
amputation 
Defective switch 
Improperly Maintained 
1.1.5 Unplug and move from the area of 
operation controlling mobile equipment 
and any guards there exist 
1.1.6 Omission (operator doesn't 
check) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure. 
Machine could start 
accidentally. Hurt, 
crushing, cutting, 
upper limb 
amputation 
Power outage Operator error, power not 
locked out 
Electrocution/Burns 
1.1.6 Closing the mold by pressing the 
intermittently button 
1.1.7 Operator does not use the 
intermittently button  
Operator error Contact with 
tools,hurt, 
crushing, cutting, 
upper limb 
amputation Accidental start of the machine 
Defective button 
1.1.7 Attach the mechanical safety of  the slide 
of the press 
1.1.8 Omission (operator doesn't 
include mechanical lock) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
No devices provided 
1.1.8 Enter security mechanical lock with key 
selector 
1.1.9 Operator wrongs to turn the 
key The devices permits to turn in the opposite site 
Machine is not in 
safe 
Key selector failure Contact problem 
1.1.9 Unlock the upper and lower mold halves 
with appropriate tools 
1.1.10 Gravity fall of the mold Operator doesn't use 
correct tools, screws 
loosened 
Crushing arms 
1.1.10 
Lift the stick of time required to run a 
smooth introduction and removal of mold 
pressing the intermittently button 
1.1.11 Operator presses incorrect 
button 
Operator error, problems 
with labelling 
Contact with tools 
and crushing arms 
1.1.11 Unplug the main motor of the press 1.1.12 Omission (operator doesn't 
disconnect the machine from 
electricity) Operator error, power not 
locked out 
Collision 
1.1.12 Remove the mold from the table using 
the means provided for this purpose 
1.1.12.1 Gravity fall of the mold Operator doesn't use 
correct tools   
1.1.12.1 The driver of the vehicle used in the 
operation of lifting and transport must 
ensure that no one is in dangerous zone 
yes 
1.1.14; 
no exit 
The driver doesn't see the 
third operator 
Operator error, he has not 
enough visibility 
Collision 
1.1.14 Place the new mold on the table, position 
it with suitable tools 
  
Gravity fall of the mold Operator doesn't use 
correct tools 
Crushing arms 
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ID Man-Machine function Link to Failure mode Causes Consequences 
1.1.14.1 
The driver of the vehicle used in the 
operation of lifting and transport must 
ensure that no one is in danger zone   
The driver doesn't see the 
third operator 
Operator error Collision 
1.1.15 Lock the two mold halves, in definitive 
way only the top one, adjust the stroke of 
the bat 
  Gravity fall of the mold Fault lock Contact with tools 
and crushing arms, 
amputation, hand 
injury 
Circumvention of the 
protection system The operator by pass the 
safe guards 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
Omission (operator forgets to 
lock the two molds) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure. 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
1.1.16 Recovery of the shelter 
  
Omission (operator forgets to 
recovery the safe guards) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure. 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
Incorrect setting of the 
operating distance between 
the transmitter and receiver 
Commissioning error of 
the operator 
Incorrect setting of the safety 
distance between the barrier 
and the danger zone 
Commissioning error of 
the operator 
1.2 
Functional check of the machine - test 
run 
        
1.2.1 Check operating selector – single stroke 
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
check the selector 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.2 Test controls – anti repeat 
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
test anti-repeat control) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.3 Test controls – protection from accidental 
activation 
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
test condition of protection 
from accidental activation) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.4 Test stop control 
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
test stop control) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.5 Test  good condition of perimeter 
protection  
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
test perimeter protection) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.5.1 Check that the guards are securely 
fastened in place with devices requiring a 
tool to release them and that no access is 
possible from any direction to the danger 
zone   
Omission (operator doesn't 
check if no access is possible 
to the danger zone) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
  
1.2.6 Verify the absence of others in the vicinity 
of the press 
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
verify) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.7 Test 2-hand controls - trial stroke with all 
safe guards in place 
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
test 2-hand controls) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Machine is not 
under control 
1.2.8 Record data and test results  
  
Operator does not record the 
test results  
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure, daily inspection 
card is not close to the 
press 
 
Machine is not 
under control 
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ID Man-Machine function Link to Failure mode Causes Consequences 
1.3 Processing material 
  
  
  
  
1.3.1 Put metal sheet in fixture   Metal sheet lowers the level of 
protection if not properly 
positioned  
Reflection of light of safe 
barriers creates a by-pass 
Safe guards 
doesn't reveal the 
presence of hand 
1.3.2 Simultaneous pressure and kept up 
launchers to run the process 
  
Operator by-passes the device Operator error, 
simplification of the work, 
time gain, bad 
ergonomics, ignorance of 
risk 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
At the moment of release of 
one actuator the command 
start again in an accidental 
way 
Wrong wiring of cables, no 
interrupt output signal to 
the release of one or both 
of the actuators 
Contact with tools, 
hurt, crushing, 
cutting, upper limb 
amputation 
1.3.3 If the light barrier intervenes, proceed to 
the manual reset 
  Omission (operator doesn't 
reset) 
Unsafe location /awkward 
position 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
Accidental restart of the 
machine 
The reset command is not 
separated from the start 
command of the press 
Contact with tools, 
hurt, crushing, 
cutting, upper limb 
amputation 
1.3.4 Remove formed part 
  
Accidental restart of the 
machine 
Wrong wiring of cables, no 
interrupt output signal to 
the release of one or both 
of the actuators 
Contact with tools, 
hurt, crushing, 
cutting, upper limb 
amputation 
Operator doesn't put in safe 
the machine 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
1.3.5 Place part in bin on floor 
  
Operator doesn't place formed 
part in correct container 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Some pieces don't 
reach the quality 
control 
1.3.6 Collect waste processing with special 
mean  and put them in media collection  
  
Omission (operator doesn't 
clean dangerous area) 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Waste 
accumulation in the 
mould 
Operator doesn't use correct 
tool 
Omitting a step or 
important instruction from 
a formal or ad hoc 
procedure 
Increase probability 
of injury for the 
operator 
1.3.7 
The operator has to disconnect the power 
supply if use of hands cannot be avoided   
Omission (operator uses 
hands without disconnecting 
the power supply 
Omitting an important 
instruction from a formal or 
ad hoc procedure 
Increase probability 
of electrocution for 
the operator 
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12.5  ANNEX: I.D.D.A. FILES 
12.5.1 File Source for SIL assignment 
:Setting of the equipment number of operators required is one 
1 0.03 0. 10 145 3 'Num op.' 'one' 'more than one' 
 
:Check area is clear of tools 
10 0. 0. 15 25 3 'Op. checks' 'yes' 'no' 
20 100 0.004 1 
 
:Presence of tools in dangerous area 
15 0. 0. 25 20 3 'Area free' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Clean dangerous area 
20 0.0125 0. 25 25 3 'Op. cleaned' 'yes' 'no' 
20 100 0.004 1 
 
:Put press on intermittently command 
25 0.00133 0. 30 150 3 'Op. correct button' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Accidental start of the machine 
30 0.00000158 0. 40 140 3 'M. not starts accidentally' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Closing the mold by pressing the intermittently button 
40 0.00133 0. 45 150 3 'Op. uses the intermittently button' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Attach the mechanical safety of the slide of the press 
45 0.0125 0. 50 150 3 'Op. put mechanical lock' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Enter security mechanical lock with key selector 
50 0.00133 0. 52 150 3 'Op. turn correctly the key' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Key selector integrity 
52 0.000004 0. 55 145 3 'Key selector works correcly' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Unlock the upper and lower mold halves with appropriate tools 
55 0.0125 0. 60 135 3 'Op. acts correctly' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Place the new mold 
60 0.00125 0. 62 135 3 'Op. acts in correct way' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Lock the two mold halves 
62 0.0125 0. 65 65 3 'Op. lock the two mold halves' 'yes' 'no' 
20 135 0.000003 1 
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:Recovery of the safe guards 
65 0.01 0. 67 70 3 'Op. restores the safe guards' 'yes' 'Op. omits' 
20 140 0.0000009 1 
 
:Recovery of the safe guards in correct position 
67 0.01 0. 70 70 3 'Correct distance transmitter and receiver' 'yes' 'no' 
20 140 0.0000009 1 
 
:Check operating selector 
70 0.0125 0. 72 72 3 'Op. checks operating selector' 'yes' 'no' 
20 106 0.00000008 1 
 
:Test controls 
72 0.0125 0. 75 75 3 'Op. tests anti repeat device' 'yes' 'no' 
20 106 0.0000001 1 
 
:Test control 
75 0.0125 0. 77 77 3 'Op. tests protection accidental activation' 'yes' 'no' 
20 106 0.0000001 1 
 
:Test stop control 
77 0.0125 0. 80 195 3 'Op. tests stop control' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Check good condition of perimeter protection 
80 0. 0. 82 195 3 'Op. checks condition of perimeter protection' 'yes' 'no' 
20 82 0.014 1 
 
:Check guards securely fastened in place, no access possible to danger zone' 
82 0.0125 0. 85 195 3 'Op. checks no access to danger zone' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Verify the absences of others in the vicinity of the press 
85 0.0125 0. 86 145 3 'Op. verifies' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Vicinity of the press 
86 0.03 0. 87 145 3 'No one near press' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Test 2-hand controls 
87 0.003 0. 90 195 3 'Op. trials stroke with safe guards in place' 'yes' 'no' 
20 105 0.000002 1 
 
:Record data and test results 
90 0.003 0. 100 195 3 'Op. records test results' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Put metal sheet in fixture 
100 0.003 0. 105 150 3 'M. sheet properly positioned' 'yes' 'no'  
 
:Simultaneous pressure and kept up launchers to run the process 
105 0.0000011 0. 106 107 3 'Simultaneous device works correctly' 'yes' 'no' 
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:Accidental start of the actuator 
106 0.0000000769 0. 140 107 3 'Command starts in an acc. way' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:By-pass the device 
107 0.0032 0. 140 110 3 'Op. by-passes device' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Remove formed part 
110 0.0000000769 0. 140 115 3 'Accidental restart of the machine' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Place part in bin on floor 
115 0.006 0. 120 200 3 'Op. put part in correct container' 'yes' 'no' 
23 200 0 0 
 
:Collect waste processing with special mean 
120 0.0124 0. 205 125 3 'Op. uses special means' 'yes' 'no' 
13 205 0 0 
 
:In the case operator has to use hands disconnect the power supply 
125 0.0125 0. 150 150 3 'Op. disconnects power supply' 'yes' 'no' 
13 150 0 0 
 
:Gravity fall of the mold 
135 0.00000158 0. 150 190 3 'mold fall' 'yes' 'no' 
13 150 0 0 
24 190 0 0 
 
:Light barrier 
140 0.0000000554 0. 190 150 3 'l.b. intervines' 'yes' 'no' 
14 190 0 0 
 
:Dangerous actions, it is reccomended to stop the operation 
145 0.0125 0. 150 150 3 'Stop operation' 'yes' 'no' 
10 150 1 1 
 
:Increase probability of injury for the operator 
150 0. 0. 155 190 3 'Contact with tools' 'yes' 'no' 
24 190 0 0 
 
:Dynamics of injury for the operator 
155 0.15 0. 160 190 3 'Hurt' 'no' 'yes' 
23 190 0 0  
 
:Dynamics of injury for the operator 
160 0.27 0. 165 190 3 'Crushing' 'no' 'yes' 
23 190 0 0 
 
:Dynamics of injury for the operator 
165 0.58 0. 170 190 3 'Cutting' 'no' 'yes' 
23 190 0 0 
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:Dynamics of injury for the operator 
170 0.37 0. 190 190 3 'Upper limb amputation' 'no' 'yes' 
14 190 0 0 
23 190 0 0 
 
:Injury to the operator 
190 1 0. 0 0 3 'Op. injured' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Machine is not under control 
195 1 0. 0 0 3 'Machine under control' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Production Losses  
200 1 0. 0 0 3 'Prod. losses' 'yes' 'no' 
 
:Correct management waste 
205 1 0. 0 0 3 'Ok collect waste' 'yes' 'no' 
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12.5.2 File source to verify Operational SIL related to light barrier.  
:Light barrier 
1 0.0000000911 0. 10 40 3 'l.b. works' 'yes' 'no' 
24 40 0 0 
 
:Recovery of the safe guards 
10 0.000039 0. 20 40 3 'Op. restores the safe guards' 'yes' 'Op. omits' 
24 40 0 0 
 
:Recovery of the safe guards in correct position 
20 0.000069 0. 30 40 3 'Correct distance transmitter and receiver' 'yes' 'no' 
24 40 0 0 
 
:By-pass the device 
30 0.00077 0. 40 40 3 'Op.no by-passes device' 'yes' 'no' 
13 40 0 0 
24 40 0 0 
 
:Availability of light barrier 
40 1 0. 0 0 3 'l.b. available' 'yes' 'no' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
